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AN ERROR AND AN EVIL:
THE STRANGE HISTORY OF
IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS
DAVID S. SCHWARTZ*
An underspecified doctrine of implied “reserved powers of the states” has been
deployed through U.S. constitutional history to prevent the full application of
McCulloch v. Maryland’s concept of implied powers to the enumerated
powers—in particular, the Commerce Clause. The primary rationales for these
implied limitations on implied federal powers stem from two eighteenth and
nineteenth century elements of American constitutionalism. First, the inability
of pre-twentieth century judges to conceptualize a workable theory of concurrent
federal and state power made it seem constitutionally necessary to limit the
Commerce Clause and to refrain from applying the concept of implied powers to
the Commerce Clause in order to preserve a substantial scope for state regulation.
Second, because slavery so obviously fed into interstate and international trade,
a robust application of implied powers to the Commerce Clause could naturally
lead to a congressional power to “interfere with” the institution of slavery within
the states. Antebellum judges and political leaders saw the implied limitation
of such a power as an inescapable element of the constitutional bargain.
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These twin supports of the implied limitation concept have been eliminated
from American constitutional law, yet the concept persists, with potentially
significant consequences. In National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, the 2012 Affordable Care Act case, for example, five
Justices maintained that there is an implied limitation against regulating
economic “inactivity.” The justification offered for this is an abstract concept of
federalism that is largely detached from the once powerful, but now defunct,
principles of constitutional politics that sustained it.
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A. Limiting Gibbons: Federal Power versus
State Police Power ..................................................... 986
B. Reversing McCulloch: the Idea of State
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JUSTICE BREYER: So I’m focusing just on the Commerce
Clause . . . [a]nd I look back into history, and I think if we look back
into history, we see sometimes Congress can create commerce out of
nothing. That’s the national bank, which was created out of nothing
to create other commerce out of nothing. I look back into history,
and I see it seems pretty clear that if there are substantial effects on
interstate commerce, Congress can act . . . .
MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Breyer, let me start at the beginning
of your question with McCulloch. McCulloch was not a commerce
power case.1
In exercising the authority conferred by [the Commerce Clause] of
the Constitution, Congress is powerless to regulate anything which
is not commerce . . . .
—United States Supreme Court in Carter v Carter Coal Co.2

1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, 64, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Florida, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-398).
2. 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936).
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INTRODUCTION
Much of American constitutional history is a 230-year debate about
the scope of federal power to regulate interstate commerce. According
to the conventional understanding, the Supreme Court narrowly
defined interstate commerce to mean trade—buying and selling in
interstate markets—plus interstate commercial travel and shipping.
Then, starting in the year of our Constitution’s sesquicentennial, 1937,
the Court shifted ground and reinterpreted interstate commerce to
mean, essentially, the U.S. economy.3 This so-called “New Deal
Settlement” was completed in 1942, in the Court’s famous Wickard v.
Filburn4 decision, which redefined the commerce power by authorizing
Congress to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.5 Then, beginning with United States v. Lopez6 in
1995, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts launched a “federalism
revival” that clarified the “substantial effects test”—or “trim[med]” it
“at its edges”7—to refer to the regulation of economic matters, which
must be activities rather than (somewhat absurdly) “inactivities.”8
Although the so-called “New Deal Settlement” and its broad
interpretation of the commerce power remains largely intact, the five
conservative Justices in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius9 (NFIB) in 2012 seemed to turn the clock back to at least 1938,
if not 1936, when ruling that free-riding in the national health care
market was not reachable as interstate commerce regulation.10
That holding strangely ignored McCulloch v. Maryland,11 the
foundational case to all participants in federalism debates since the
early 1900s. Chief Justice Roberts, for example, purported to rely on
McCulloch in providing the decisive fifth vote for the proposition that
requiring uninsured people to buy health insurance violated the limits
on the commerce power.12 Yet McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers

3. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
4. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
5. Id. at 124–25.
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519, 556–57 (2012).
9. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
10. Id. at 588 (noting that the individual mandate cannot be upheld under the
Commerce Clause); id. at 657 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 560.
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gives Congress broad authority to do things that are not definitionally
authorized by the enumerated powers, so long as they are “conducive”
or “plainly adapted” to the exercise of an enumerated power. Indeed,
less than a decade before NFIB, in Gonzales v. Raich,13 Justice Scalia
made this very point: pursuant to McCulloch, Congress can regulate
things that are neither interstate nor commerce in order to make the
regulation of an interstate market more effective.14 Scalia argued that
criminalizing simple possession of marijuana was in that way a
“necessary and proper” element of Congress’s nationwide prohibition
of a market for marijuana.15 None of the other Justices bought into
this analysis in Raich, and even Scalia refused to recognize his own
argument seven years later in NFIB.16
These puzzling facts point to a larger mystery at the heart of American
federalism. If McCulloch provides the definitive understanding of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the application of its doctrine to the
Commerce Clause should have produced a set of constitutional
understandings dramatically different from those that were maintained
by the Supreme Court for the first 150 years of the Republic, and those
that in vestigial form re-emerged in NFIB. An implied power, according
to the prevailing understanding of McCulloch, is a power to regulate
things that are not in themselves within the definition of an enumerated
power, but whose regulation would be useful to implementing that
enumerated power.17 The range of things that fall within the definition
of a concept is akin to the logical entailments of that concept. It is much
narrower than the range of things that support or sustain that concept
in a practical way. Implied powers partake of the latter relationship,

13. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
14. Id. at 38–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
15. Id. at 34–35.
16. Id. at 33. See generally NFIB, 567 U.S. at 646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,
JJ., dissenting) (failing to frame the Necessary and Proper Clause as an issue in the case).
17. A significant and growing literature argues that the federal government is
recognized to have important powers that are neither enumerated nor means to carry
out those that are. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 25 (2006); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102
GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014); Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576
(2014) [hereinafter Primus, The Limits of Enumeration]; David S. Schwartz, A Question
Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable Federalism and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59
ARIZ. L. REV. 573 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising].
Arguably, McCulloch is best read as supporting this idea. See John Mikhail, McCulloch’s
Strategic Ambiguity (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author). That point, though
important, is tangential to my argument here.
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having the much broader and looser relatedness suggested by Marshall’s
terminology (“conducive,” “convenient,” “plainly adapted”).18
During the Antebellum Period, applying McCulloch to the
Commerce Clause would have meant an implied power to build and
regulate interstate roads and to regulate or even abolish slave labor. In
the post-Reconstruction era, implied commerce powers under
McCulloch should have made clear that Congress had the power to
regulate racially discriminatory intrastate economic transactions. And
in the Lochner/early New Deal period, an acknowledgement of implied
commerce powers should have recognized Congress’s authority to
regulate labor, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. Yet all these
claims of power were highly contested by constitutional interpreters
and were blocked by the Supreme Court before 1937.
The Court’s stubborn refusal to apply McCulloch’s conception of
implied powers to the Commerce Clause has largely escaped notice,
and it arguably made a difference in the outcome of NFIB. This Article
argues that the Court’s refusal stems from two eighteenth and
nineteenth century elements of American constitutional thought that
were eliminated long ago. One element was the inability of pretwentieth century judges to conceptualize a broad and workable theory
of concurrent federal and state power. To the nineteenth-century
legal mind, most federal and state powers were to some degree,
mutually exclusive. In a commercial nation, in which most human
activities eventually channeled into the stream of commerce, it seemed
constitutionally necessary to many jurists to limit the Commerce Clause
and implied powers—and especially to refrain from applying the
concept of implied powers to the Commerce Clause—in order to
preserve a substantial scope for state regulation.
The other element was slavery. The most salient factor limiting
implied commerce powers in the Antebellum Period was the belief that
states had to maintain control over the legality of slavery within their
borders. Because slavery was so obviously a commercial system that fed
into interstate and international trade, a robust application of
McCulloch’s doctrine of implied powers to the Commerce Clause would
naturally lead to a congressional power to “interfere with” the institution
of slavery within the states. Mainstream constitutional interpreters
viewed the implied limitation of such a power as an inescapable element
of the constitutional bargain by antebellum judges and political

18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415, 421–22 (1819).
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leaders.19 Notwithstanding the Civil War and the Reconstruction
amendments ending slavery and authorizing federal protection of
freed slaves, the Court by the end of the nineteenth century, reverted
to an implied limitation against federal control over race relations as it
ratified southern states’ “home rule” and Jim Crow regimes.20
These twin normative justifications for implied limitations on implied
commerce powers fed into a robust doctrine of reserved state powers.
Although mentioned in the Tenth Amendment, the idea of reserved
sovereign powers of the states was itself an implication rather than an
“enumeration” in our constitutional order, because its content is
unspecified. What powers are reserved to the states? And what does
“reserved” even mean in this context? Nineteenth century jurisprudence
developed the idea that the power to regulate a specific, identifiable set
of things was reserved to the states, and those things were identifiable by
their connection to slavery: labor and the production of goods for trade
(i.e., manufacturing, mining, and agriculture) made up the content of
reserved powers. The meaning of “reserved to the states” meant off
limits to federal regulation, and in particular, immunity from federal
implied commerce regulation.
By the end of the 1960s, however, both of these twin supports of the
implied limitation on implied commerce powers ceased to exist in
American constitutional law. Acceptance of concurrent, overlapping
regulatory powers of federal and state governments, coordinated by
preemption doctrine, had become the prevailing constitutional idea,
as had a federal commerce power to regulate intrastate race relations.
The idea that “reserved state powers” could defeat an assertion of
implied commerce powers was definitively rejected, as expressed in the
Court’s famous New Deal statement in United States v. Darby Lumber
Co.21 There the Court said that the Tenth Amendment “states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”22 Under
this conception, reserved state powers consist of whatever is left after
application of federal preemption doctrine. Yet, the concept of
reserved state powers as something capable of defeating claims of
implied commerce powers has made a partial comeback. The Lopez-

19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (upholding racial
segregation laws for public facilities under the separate but equal doctrine), overruled
by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
22. Id. at 124.
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Morrison-NFIB line of cases stands in tension with Darby’s “truism”
principle by contending, in essence, that there must be some matters
that the federal government cannot regulate, and thus, by implication,
that there must be some content to the reserved powers of the states
after all. In reaching this conclusion, the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts’ conservatives claimed to rely on constitutional pedigree: “the
principle that ‘[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of
limited powers,’ while reserving a generalized police power to the
States, is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history.”23 Yet that
history, as this Article argues, is not one with which the Court should
want to claim a continuity. It is a history built upon a conceptual error
and a constitutional evil. The conceptual error is the nineteenth
century Court’s inability to conceive of a workable doctrine of
concurrent power. The constitutional evil is the constitutional order’s
accommodation with slavery, and later Jim Crow, by leaving individual
states to decide for themselves how best to regulate race relations.
Part I of this Article lays out the doctrinal puzzle. While paying
deference to the idea that McCulloch provides the authoritative
statement of the implied powers of Congress, the Court nevertheless
continues to decide cases as though McCulloch did not apply to the
Commerce Clause. Part II begins the historical inquiry into this puzzle.
It shows how the standard federalism doctrines of limited enumerated
powers and reserved state powers were historically connected to the
constitutional error and evil: the failure to conceptualize concurrent
federal-state powers and the accommodation of slavery.
Part III turns to the Marshall Court’s classic statements of
congressional power, McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden. This Part argues
that these opinions themselves shied away from acknowledging
implied commerce powers, largely because the error of concurrent
powers and the evil of slavery accommodation shaped the Court’s
thinking. Part IV demonstrates that these jurisprudential concerns
became more explicit in the Taney Court, which silently overruled
McCulloch in order to resist federal commerce preemption and
promote a vision of reserved state powers primarily intended to protect
states’ rights to maintain slavery. Part V carries the narrative from the
Lochner era to the present. While the New Deal Court briefly embraced
the idea of implied commerce powers, its more recent jurisprudence
has partially revived the notion that implied commerce powers can be

23. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (alteration in original).
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defeated by an inchoate version of reserved state powers, in the form of
a rule that there “must be something” that Congress cannot regulate.
This Article makes an important distinction in terminology by using
the term “Commerce Clause” to refer to the language of the enumerated
power to regulate commerce, while using the term “commerce power”
to refer more broadly to express and implied commerce powers:
whatever Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause,
including those implied powers that are “conducive” or “plainly
adapted” to regulating commerce. Though the terms “Commerce
Clause” and “commerce power” are normally used interchangeably in
constitutional discourse, this is part of the problem: a tendency to
gloss over the notion of powers implied under the Commerce Clause.
I. THE LIMITS OF IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS
A. A Doctrinal Puzzle
In 2012, in NFIB, the Supreme Court came within a hair’s breadth of
striking down the Affordable Care Act, the most sweeping national
health care legislation in nearly fifty years, and the painstakingly
negotiated product of decades of often futile legislative effort.24 The five
conservative Justices concluded that Congress’s commerce power does
not include the power to regulate economic “inactivity” and, therefore,
Congress lacked authority to mandate individuals purchase health
insurance.25 This health insurance purchase “individual mandate,”
widely recognized as the keystone to the entire statute, survived this
constitutional challenge only because Chief Justice Roberts decided that
it could be upheld as a tax, under Congress’s taxing power.26
24. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with
a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/
health/policy/24health.html; A History of Overhauling Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/19/us/politics
/20090717_HEALTH_TIMELINE.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
25. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 556–67 (2012)
(permitting Congress to anticipate future activity just to regulate it is not supported by
Commerce Clause precedent); see also id. at 658 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (allowing Congress to regulate inactivity as commerce is to recognize an
unlimited commerce power).
26. Id. at 588. The distinction is far from academic. Just as the taxing power
rationale gave supporters of the law a second bite at the apple of constitutionality before
the Court in 2012, it gave a Republican-controlled Congress a second bite at repealing
this provision in 2017. See Juliet Eilperin & Carolyn Y. Johnson, What’s Next for the
Affordable Care Act Now that Repeal has Failed?, WASH. POST. (July 28, 2017),
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Why couldn’t Congress regulate a particular form of “economic
inactivity” that was essential to its broad regulation of the health care
market? The answer can’t be simply what the conservative Justices told
us: that “inactivity” is not “commerce.”27 After all, the concept of
implied powers, established in McCulloch, tells us that Congress may
assert a power not expressly granted—here, regulation of “inactivity”—
that is convenient, plainly adapted, conducive, etc., to executing its
enumerated powers (here, regulation of interstate commerce).28
Simply holding that “inactivity” is not “commerce” merely tells us that
regulating inactivity is not an exercise of the express power of
regulating commerce. But implied powers do not depend on
definitions of express powers. Rather, they flow from the practical
relationship between the regulatory object and the express power.
Ironically, Justice Scalia made this very point a few years before NFIB,
in his concurrence in Gonzales v. Raich.29 The federal Controlled
Substances Act30 criminalizes, among many other things, the simple
possession of marijuana.31 If that is an “economic activity” at all, Scalia
observed, it is certainly not an interstate one. Nor, as Scalia implied,
was the home growing of a few marijuana plants for personal
consumption.32 Yet, the federal act could outlaw these things because:
[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of
interstate commerce, “it possesses every power needed to make that
regulation effective.” Although this power “to make . . . regulation
effective” commonly overlaps with the authority to regulate
economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,
and may in some cases have been confused with that authority, the
two are distinct. The regulation of an intrastate activity may be
essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even
though the intrastate activity does not itself “substantially affect”
interstate commerce. Moreover, as [Lopez] suggests, Congress may
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/whats-next-for-the-affordab
le-care-act-now-that-repeal-has-failed/2017/07/28/e209c7ce-70b5-11e7-9eac-d56bd556
8db8_story.
27. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 658 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(explaining that “inactivity” cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause because
“[i]f all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is everything”).
28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418, 421 (1819).
29. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012).
31. Id. § 844(a), (c).
32. Raich, 545 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

2019]

AN ERROR AND AN EVIL

937

necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.
The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are
“reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under
the commerce power . . . .33
[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause . . . empowers Congress to enact
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its
authority to enact in isolation. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 421–22 (1819).34

In sum, Congress could outlaw simple possession, home growing, and
consumption of marijuana not because they were “economic activities,”
and therefore within the definition of commerce—note that Scalia would
ridicule the idea that consumption of broccoli was “economic activity” in
the NFIB case.35 Rather, these things fell within Congress’s implied
commerce powers under McCulloch because their prohibition was plainly
adapted to the regulation of an interstate black market in marijuana.
Chief Justice Roberts and the NFIB joint dissenters recognized the
practical necessity of the individual mandate to regulating the markets
for health care services; indeed, the joint dissenters argued that the
entire statute must be struck down because it could not work without
the individual mandate.36 The joint dissenters, including Scalia himself,
simply ignored Scalia’s point in Raich. Roberts, for his part, tried to
finesse this point by arguing, circularly, that however “necessary” the
individual mandate was, it was not “proper” because it was not within the
definition of commerce! Roberts argued, “[t]he individual mandate . . .
vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary
predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”37 That is to say, the
mandate impermissibly requires a purchase of health insurance in order
to regulate it, as Roberts saw it. But the market for health services and
insurance is undoubtedly commerce, and for Roberts to say that
commercial activity is a “necessary predicate” for commerce power
regulation is to limit commerce regulation to its definition and exclude
implied powers. The five-Justice majority essentially argued that the
definition of commerce, despite its breadth, is not broad enough to reach

33. Id. at 36–37.
34. Id. at 39.
35. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 660 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, id. at 519, (No. 11398) (quoting Justice Scalia’s quip “therefore, you can make people buy broccoli”).
36. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
37. Id.
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inactivity.38 The concept of implied commerce powers was given short
shrift—or entirely ignored. The implication is that, perhaps because of
its breadth, the Commerce Clause must be interpreted as though implied
powers did not flow from it.
Thus, five Justices agreed that the doctrine of implied powers should
not be applied to the Commerce Clause in NFIB. And in Raich, eight
Justices ignored McCulloch, appearing to believe that the concept of
implied commerce powers was irrelevant to their analysis.
It is easy to argue that the Commerce Clause is in some senses
unique among the enumerated powers. It is now, hands down, the
broadest regulatory power Congress has, and it has undoubtedly
undergone the most transformative expansion in how our
constitutional order interprets it. These features of the Commerce
Clause are well known. What has flown beneath the radar is a kind of
“Commerce Clause exceptionalism” with respect to McCulloch and
implied powers. Those who fail or refuse to acknowledge implied
commerce powers, such as the Justices in cases like Raich and NFIB,
don’t explain their failure.
B. The Return of Reserved State Powers
According to the Tenth Amendment, the reserved powers of the
states are those powers “not delegated to the United States.” Wellestablished constitutional doctrine holds that the “delegat[ion] to the
United States” includes both enumerated and implied powers.
“Reserved to the states” implies powers that are withheld from the
United States. In an important sense, then, reserved state powers
negatively express the limits on delegated, and particularly on implied,
federal powers. As will be seen, the most historically important
application of the concept of reserved state powers for more than a
century was to impose implied limits on implied commerce powers.
Modern doctrine holds that the Tenth Amendment “states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”39 This
important statement means that reserved state powers do not have
definite content, but rather represent an equation that states retain a
residuum of powers determined to be “not delegated” to the United
States. Given that implied powers are not a fixed quantum or fixed
target, but arise due to circumstantial adaptations to regulatory

38. See, e.g., id. at 658.
39. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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problems, reserved state powers also cannot be fixed as a pre-defined set
of powers. Darby’s “truism” principle also means that reserved state
powers cannot act as a logically independent limit on implied powers.
Whether a claimed federal regulatory power can be implied depends on
its being “necessary and proper” to executing an enumerated power, not
on its avoidance of infringement on a purportedly reserved state power.
While claiming to adhere to Darby’s truism principle, the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts have walked it back somewhat. In Lopez and Morrison, the
Court rejected assertions of federal commerce power largely on the
contention that “the Constitution’s enumeration of powers” requires the
Court to “presuppose[] something not enumerated”—something
consisting of the reserved powers of the states.40 This strikingly contextdistorting quotation from Gibbons v. Ogden41 assumes a constitutional
theory in which “there must be something” that Congress cannot
regulate.42 That something emerges only from time to time and
circumstantially, but to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, its existence is
needed to prove the limiting effect of the enumerated powers.43
Rather than acknowledging that “reserved state powers” are merely
a truism, Lopez regresses to the premise that the reserved state powers
have content. To be sure, that content is a sort of constitutional dark
matter that is known to exist without being clearly identified. Richard
Primus has referred to this premise as “the internal-limits canon,” the
idea that the federal government is denied a general police power.44
Rather than relying on Primus’s label, which gives the doctrine more
of an air of dignity than it deserves, this Article refers to it as the
“mustbesomething” rule.

40. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615, 616 n.7 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
42. Id. at 195. As Richard Primus explains, the quotation referred only to the
enumeration in the Commerce Clause itself, not to the entirety of the Constitution’s
enumerated powers. Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall’s point was not to stress limits
on federal power, but to indicate that the delegation of a federal commerce power did
not entirely wipe out the states’ power to regulate their “purely internal” commerce.
Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567, 586–87, 615 (2017).
43. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 587–90.
44. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 578; see also Andrew Coan,
Implementing Enumeration, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 1988 (2016).
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II. RECAPTURING NINETEENTH CENTURY FEDERALISM
The reluctance to apply McCulloch’s doctrine of implied powers to the
Commerce Clause did not crop up for the first time in the Rehnquist or
Roberts Courts. Indeed, it is traceable to the Marshall Court, which itself
went to some lengths to avoid embracing implied commerce powers—
even in McCulloch. To see this, however, requires taking a detailed look
at the historical context for antebellum constitutional opinions. The
context involves the interaction of constitutional law and constitutional
politics. The latter are primarily the debates over policies that tend to
reflect the more fundamental differences over the nature of
government and to settle into political party differences, though they
are typically framed as arguments over constitutional principles.45 But it
need hardly be said that constitutional law and politics heavily influence
one another, and that the two tend to converge around the articulation
of constitutional principles.
A. Constitutional Law
The antebellum Supreme Court was repeatedly faced with two
federalism questions: How extensive were the powers delegated to the
national government, and what were the implications for state
regulatory authority in fields overlapping with these delegations?
These questions gave rise to two doctrinal problems: implied powers
and concurrent powers. Implied powers created an interpretive fog
around the edges of the enumerated powers, making their extent
uncertain. “Concurrent powers” is my shorthand for the complex
question: Does the Constitution’s delegation of power to the federal
government, or the exercise of a delegated power by legislation,
preclude state legislation over the same objects? These two intertwined
problems potentially arise with regard to any enumerated power, but
they were particularly vexing in connection the Commerce Clause, that
broadest of enumerated legislative powers. The problems were never
satisfactorily solved by nineteenth century jurists.
1. Separate spheres: exclusive versus concurrent powers
The Antifederalists, who opposed ratification of the Constitution,
and later the Jeffersonian Republicans, who dominated politics in the
two decades following Jefferson’s election to the presidency in 1800,

45. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES
GOVERNMENT xxii (2d ed. 2013).

OF
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frequently expressed anxiety about expansive federal power leading
inexorably to a “consolidated government.”46 By this, they meant a
national government that exercised all legislative power. Modern
constitutional scholars tend to understand this fear partially and
ahistorically by viewing it through the prism of laissez faire and
libertarian ideologies that emerged at the end of the nineteenth
century.47 Viewed that way, the fears of consolidated government
should present a puzzle because federal regulation was comparatively
sparse for much of the nineteenth century. The answer to this puzzle
requires recognizing that resistance to expansive interpretations of
federal power was motivated in large part, not by opposition to
regulation as such, but the opposite.
Many constitutional interpreters feared that grants of power to the
general government would be construed as exclusive, and thereby
eliminate wide swaths of municipal laws governing health, safety, and
commercial life.48 As legal historian William Novak has shown,
antebellum America was not characterized by laissez faire.49
Notwithstanding the sparseness of federal regulation, American life
was subject to dense regulatory regimes at the state and particularly the
local level. Antebellum judges were concerned to maintain a “wellregulated society,” characterized by dense networks of laws promoting
the general welfare and regulating property and conduct.50 These laws
came to be known under the heading of state “police power” or
“municipal legislation.”51 Many judges were deeply concerned by
arguments that various constitutional grants of federal power excluded
states from exercising similar powers, even in its “dormant” state”—
that is, even in the absence of federal legislation.52

46. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 141 (1969).
47. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10, 20–21 (1993) (emphasizing
connections between Jacksonian and later laissez-faire jurisprudence); see also William
J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 753 (2008)
(noting that in the nineteenth century, state legislatures were already heavily
regulating the economy).
48. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 595.
49. Novak, supra note 47, at 753.
50. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 16–17 (1996).
51. Id. at 16; New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837).
52. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
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The Commerce Clause created the deepest concern. In 1812, the
New York Court for the Correction of Errors decided Livingston v. Van
Ingen,53 a federal dormant commerce challenge to the LivingstonFulton steamboat monopoly on the Hudson River that would be
invalidated a decade later by the Supreme Court in Gibbons. The court
upheld the monopoly, and the lead opinion by James Kent explained
the rejection of dormant Commerce Clause exclusivity in these terms:
Our turnpike roads, our toll-bridges, the exclusive grant to run stage
waggons [sic], our laws relating to paupers from other states, our
Sunday laws, our rights of ferriage over navigable rivers and lakes,
our auction licenses, our licenses to retail spirituous liquors, the laws
to restrain hawkers and pedlars [sic]; what are all these provisions
but regulations of internal commerce, affecting as well the
intercourse between the citizens of this and other states, as between
our own citizens? So we also exercise, to a considerable degree, a
concurrent power with congress in the regulation of external
commerce. What are our inspection laws relative to the staple
commodities of this state, which prohibit the exportation, except
upon certain conditions, of flour, of salt provisions, of certain
articles of lumber, and of pot and pearl ashes, but regulations of
external commerce? Our health and quarantine laws, and the laws
prohibiting the importation of slaves are striking examples of the
same kind. So the act relative to the poor, which requires all masters
of vessels coming from abroad to report and give security to the mayor
of New York, that the passengers, being aliens, shall not become
chargeable as paupers, and in case of default, making even the ship or
vessel from which the alien shall be landed liable to seizure, is another
and very important regulation affecting foreign commerce.
Are we prepared to say, in the face of all these regulations, which form
such a mass of evidence of the uniform construction of our powers,
that a special privilege for the exclusive navigation by a steam-boat
upon our waters, is void, because it may, by possibility, and in the
course of events, interfere with the power granted to congress to
regulate commerce? Nothing, in my opinion, would be more
preposterous and extravagant. Which of our existing regulations may
not equally interfere with the power of congress?54

More than a generation later, judicial doctrine had still not alleviated
these fears. Justice Catron’s concurring opinion in The License Cases55 is
illustrative. To hold the federal commerce power to be exclusive, he
53. 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).
54. Id. at 580.
55. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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warned, “would overthrow and annul entire codes of State legislation”
and “expunge more State laws and city corporate regulations than
Congress is likely to make in a century on the same subject.”56
These fears might seem odd, since modern constitutional lawyers so
easily accept the idea that the federal and state governments exercise
concurrent powers. Coordination of overlapping federal and state
jurisdiction is handled through preemption doctrine, which generally
tolerates the simultaneous pursuit of non-conflicting policies by the
two levels of government. To be sure, antebellum constitutionalists
understood the potential for conflict between federal and state laws—
hence, the Supremacy Clause—but this understanding entailed laws
having regulatory effects on the same subject but coming from
different sources of power. Kent articulated something close to the
modern view of concurrent federal and state powers in 1812 in
Livingston. “It does not follow,” he wrote, “that because a given power
is granted to congress, the states cannot exercise a similar power.”57
Unless denied powers by the U.S. Constitution in express terms, or by
“necessary implication,” states “may then go on in the exercise of the
power until it comes practically in collision with the actual exercise of
some congressional power.”58 In such a case, “the state authority will
so far be controlled, but it will still be good in all those respects in
which it does not absolutely contravene the provision of the
paramount law.”59 But Kent was virtually alone in articulating this
concept, and was 100 years ahead of his time. Far more typical was the
view expressed by Justice Bushrod Washington, announcing the
judgment of the Marshall Court in Houston v. Moore:60 “I am altogether
incapable of comprehending how two distinct wills can, at the same
time, be exercised in relation to the same subject, to be effectual, and
at the same time compatible with each other.”61
Washington’s constitutional mind-set, conceiving federal and state
power as separate and non-overlapping spheres, can be seen in the
nation’s founding documents. The Tenth Amendment seems to
assume this view in providing that “[t]he powers . . . reserved to the
States” are those “not delegated to the United States by the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 607 (Catron, J., concurring).
Livingston, 9 Johns. at 574 (Kent, J.).
Id. at 576.
Id.
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
Id. at 23.
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Constitution.” Similarly, the Articles of Confederation declared that
“[e]ach state retains . . . every power, jurisdiction and right, which is
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled.”62 The implication that states “surrendered”
powers that were delegated (or expressly delegated) to the national
government was articulated with some frequency by constitutional
lawyers and judges.63 If a grant of power to the general government is
a surrender of that power formerly held by the states, then it would be
difficult to conceive how both governments could exercise it. Thus,
nineteenth century constitutionalists widely believed that federal and
state legislative powers were confined to “separate spheres” that were
mutually exclusive.64 The Constitution’s grant of a power to the federal
government created a strong presumption that states were precluded
from exercising that same power concurrently.
This view of things meant that expansive interpretations of federal
power could prove highly disruptive to the well-ordered society by
replacing the dense fabric of state and local laws with sparse federal
legislation or “dormant power.” Keeping federal powers “few and
defined” would, in a world of mutual exclusivity, be essential to
preserving state authority to regulate.
The separate spheres concept was fraught with disagreement and
conceptual confusion about the nature of exclusive and concurrent
powers. The starting point for antebellum judges was typically
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 32, which states the federal power can be
exclusive in three circumstances: an express excusive grant to Congress
(e.g., governing the federal capital district), an express prohibition
against the states (e.g., coining money) or a grant to Congress of a power
62. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. II.
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 452 (1827) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he power of Congress to regulate commerce . . . was a power possessed
by the States respectively before the adoption of the constitution, and . . . is to be viewed,
therefore, as the surrender of a power antecedently possessed by the States.”); Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325 (1816) (“[T]he sovereign powers vested in
the state governments, by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and
unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States.”);
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (“[T]he United States have no claim
to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them.”).
64. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (“We have in
this Republic, a dual system of government, National and state, each operating within
the same territory and upon the same persons; and yet working without collision, because
their functions are different.”); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1950) (defining “dual federalism” in terms of separate spheres).

2019]

AN ERROR AND AN EVIL

945

whose nature was not divisible between dual sovereigns.65 But this
explanation provided little real guidance, since the difficult cases all fall
into the third category, and Hamilton begs the imponderable question
of how to identify “indivisible” grants of power.
A further problem with the separate spheres concept was whether a
federal grant of power, if exclusive, would be exclusive in its negative or
dormant state—that is, by virtue of the grant per se, even in the absence
of federal legislation. The Marshall Court struggled inconclusively with
this issue. In Sturges v. Crowninshield,66 decided two weeks before
McCulloch, the Court unanimously rejected the claim that New York’s
bankruptcy law was barred by a dormant bankruptcy power.67 While
state bankruptcy laws might be “perhaps[] incompatible” with a uniform
federal bankruptcy law, Congress had not yet enacted any such law, the
Court ambiguously decided.68 But other enumerated powers might still
be exclusive in their dormant state.
The preclusive effect of federal legislation was also uncertain.
Antebellum judges frequently spoke of “collision” and “conflict”
between particular federal and state statutes. In such cases, the courts
recognized, the Supremacy Clause meant that federal law would win the
conflict.69 But it was more often than not unclear whether the conflict
arose from incompatible policies between the two laws or, instead, from
a view that once Congress regulated, then any state law in the same
regulatory space created a collision. In other words, antebellum Justices
had not yet worked out the modern distinction between what we now
call “conflict preemption” and “field preemption.”70
Lacking a conflict/field preemption distinction, antebellum judges
did not necessarily conceive of “concurrent” powers the way we do
today. Modern doctrine recognizes that states have the power to
regulate interstate commerce in a non-discriminatory manner that

65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851); Livingston
v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 576 (N.Y. 1812).
66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
67. Id. at 196–97.
68. Id. at 194.
69. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824).
70. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
801 (1994) (explaining that because there was so little federal legislation in the
nineteenth century the initial cases of preemption norm arose after 1912); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401–03 (3d ed.
2006) (explaining conflict and field preemption).
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does not conflict with federal law or enter a field exclusively occupied
by a federal statute.71 Antebellum judges typically assumed that states
had no power to regulate interstate commerce as such, but could
effectively do so indirectly, by exercising so-called “police powers”—
that is, by purporting to regulate health, safety, or morals.72 In other
words, nineteenth century “concurrent powers” could be recognized
only insofar as the federal and state powers were deemed to come from
different sources (police rather than commerce power) or to have
different regulatory objectives (health or safety rather than trade).
The problem of exclusivity was further complicated by the concept
of implied powers. Federal legislation under implied powers would
broaden the potential of federal power to nullify state law under a
conflict preemption approach. But for jurists who adopted a protofield-preemption understanding of federal exclusivity, the implied
powers would have the potential to extend federal exclusivity—not
mere conflict preemption—far beyond the four corners of the
enumerated powers.73 For example, under a proto-field preemption
approach, an implied power to create a national bank would occupy
the field of banking and exclude states’ power to charter banks.
2. The problem of implied powers
An axiom of American constitutionalism holds that the government
of the United States is one of limited powers. Expressing the
conventional view, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in 2012 that “rather
than granting general authority to perform all the conceivable
functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the
Federal Government’s powers . . .
The Constitution’s express
conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant others.”74
But that begs an important question: is the federal government strictly
limited to those enumerated powers?
Despite its axiomatic quality, the idea of limited enumerated powers
is highly problematic because it is difficult to implement and debatable
as a matter of original intent.75 Any enumeration or list of terms set
out in a legal instrument—whether it be a statute, contract, will,
71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 401–12.
72. See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 208; New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
102, 132 (1837); see infra Part IV.
73. See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 576 (N.Y. 1812); see also Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 47.
74. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012).
75. See Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 590–608.
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corporate charter, or constitution—presents the interpretive question
whether the list is meant to be exhaustive or illustrative. To interpret
the list as exhaustive means to exclude what is not listed. This
approach is captured by the interpretive canon expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: “the expression of one [thing] is the exclusion of
other[s].”76 Some, but not all, lists or enumerations are meant to be
interpreted this way. However, an opposing approach asks interpreters
to imply the inclusion of items “of the same nature”—ejusdem generis,
in the pertinent legal Latin phrase.77 Contrary to the conventional
view, the Constitution does not specify whether its enumeration of
powers is meant to be exhaustive or illustrative.78
The Constitution’s particular enumeration of powers defies a
consistent application of the expressio unius principle. For example,
Article I, section 8, and Article III, section 3, clause 2 authorize Congress
to create criminal punishments for counterfeiting, piracy, and treason,
respectively. Rigorous application of expressio unius should lead to the
conclusion that Congress has no power to impose other criminal
punishments. The enumerated power to create post offices would
likewise imply that Congress cannot create other administrative
departments or agencies. The enumerated power to call out the militia
to “repel invasions” would suggest that the regular army could not be
employed for that purpose. These results are absurd, of course, and
doubtless not how the Constitution was meant to be interpreted; but that
tends to undermine the exclusivity principle of enumerated powers.79
The exclusivity principle is likewise flouted by interpreting
enumerated powers to imply similar powers of like magnitude or
greater. Examples of this include implying a power to issue paper
money from the enumerated power to coin money,80 and implying a
power to deport aliens from the enumerated power to “naturalize”
foreigners into American citizenship.81 These long-accepted national
powers do not fit the model of limited enumerated powers.82

76. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION:
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 1091 (2014).
77. Id. at 455.
78. See id. at 590–91.
79. Id. at 600–03.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
81. Id. cl. 4.
82. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 621–24 (listing the many
unenumerated powers that have commonly been accepted as legitimate implied powers).
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Constitutional history has muddied the waters on these questions.
Many political leaders in the early Republic couched their
constitutional arguments in terms of limited enumerated powers,
either because their political agenda entailed limiting federal power
or because they wished to sell a nationalist agenda to their stricter
constructionist colleagues.
After Jefferson’s election in 1800,
professions of limited enumerated powers were even more apt to
predominate, and assertions of nationalism tended to be more
encoded in those terms.83 Yet the nation continued to work around
the limits of rigorous enumerated powers doctrine from time to time,
when the enumerated powers proved inconveniently narrow. As late
as 1817, Jefferson recognized that the original public meaning of the
Constitution’s enumeration was contested. The tenet that Congress
has only the power to provide for enumerated powers, and not for the
general welfare “is almost the only landmark which now divides the
federalists from the republicans.”84
Further complicating the enumerated powers model is the problem
of implied powers. An implied power is qualitatively different from an
enumerated power. For example, there is no enumerated power to
create courts outside of Article III, but courts martial are conducive or
“plainly adapted” to enforcing the “Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”85 An implied power serves
an enumerated power by authorizing legislative means that are not
logically entailed in the enumerated power, and extends to subject
matter that falls outside the definition of an enumerated power.86
Thus, implied powers can reach unenumerated regulatory objects.
In a logical sense, implied powers are a virtually unavoidable feature
of a written Constitution.87 This unavoidability can be readily seen by

83. 2 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–
1829 120–22, 258–78 (2001) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS].
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; see An Act for the Government of the Navy of the
United States, 1 Stat. 709–10 (1799) (creating courts martial); 1 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 243 n.40 (1997)
[hereinafter CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD] (noting absence of constitutional objections
to creating courts martial).
86. See Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 609–11; cf.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409–11 (1819).
87. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407–10; Alexander Hamilton, Final Version
of An Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a National Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS
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trying to envision how the granted legislative powers could be executed
without them. A tax on whiskey might be said to be a specific example,
and thus a direct exercise, of the enumerated taxing power. But not
all legislation can be so obviously a specific instance of the general
category described as an enumerated power. Far from it. Once we
move into the details of implementation, implied powers questions
quickly emerge. How is the whiskey tax to be collected? The hiring of
federal tax collectors may well be implicit in the power to “collect”
taxes, but it is not simply a specific example of tax collection—it is
easier and more logical to conceive it as an implied power than to
characterize it as a direct implementation of the taxing power.
The logical necessity of implied powers was understood from the
beginning of the Republic. Hamilton recognized this fact.88 So did
the Marshall Court in a now-obscure 1805 decision, United States v.
Fisher.89 The existence of implied powers was thus well established by
the time Marshall explained in McCulloch that “[a] constitution, to
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code . . . .”90
Therefore, while its “great outlines” and “important objects” will be
stated expressly, the means to implement them must be “deduced.”91
Denying the existence of implied powers makes legislative
implementation unduly difficult, if not logically impossible, as
legislators and courts would become hopelessly bogged down in arid
debates over whether, for example, the hiring of a tax collector was
“directly” authorized by the taxing power.
Thus, even strict Jeffersonian enumerationists acknowledged the
existence of implied powers.92 But the existence of implied powers
creates challenging interpretive and analytical problems when applied
to the framework of limited enumerated powers. Since implied powers
are by definition not enumerated, it becomes necessary to distinguish
between permissible and impermissible implied powers: distinguishing

OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97–98 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1965)
[hereinafter Opinion on Constitutionality].
88. Hamilton, Opinion on Constitutionality, supra note 87, at 8–9.
89. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
90. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 409 (“It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply
the ordinary means of execution.”).
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those that somehow do not disrupt the purportedly exclusive nature of
the enumerated powers from those that do.
The Antifederalist wing of the Jeffersonian party argued that express
legislative powers could be implemented by only those laws strictly
necessary to exercising the express grant. They defined strict necessity
as that without which the express power would be nugatory.93 Aside
from the rejection of this argument in McCulloch,94 we can see that the
argument tends to collapse in on itself logically. A tax on whiskey
might be a direct implementation of the taxing power, and one could
say the power to impose an excise on a commodity is strictly necessary
for the exercise of the taxing power. But a power to tax whiskey is not
strictly necessary because the taxing power could be exercised by
taxing carriages or by customs duties.95 Thus, the “strict necessity” test
for implied powers creates a paradox. As Marshall recognized in Fisher,
“Where various systems might be adopted for [a legislative] purpose, it
might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary because
the end might be obtained by other means.”96
The First and Second Banks of the United States themselves were stark
reminders of the implied powers problem. Although private, the Banks
were exemplars of a large federal administrative agency, sending branches
into all of the states and making their impact felt broadly and deeply
throughout U.S. economic life.97 Despite McCulloch, the constitutionality
of such an institution was never truly settled in the form of a broad
national consensus.98 Opposition to the re-charter of a national bank
persisted until the issue fell off the national agenda, after Civil War
financing demonstrated that such an institution could be done
without.99 To advocates of strict construction and states’ rights, if an
institution such as the Bank could be implied as a power of Congress,
it would be hard to discern the limits of implied powers.100
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413–14.
Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising, supra note 17, at 610.
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424; EDWARD S. KAPLAN, THE BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 57 (1999).
98. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,
15 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch].
99. See KAPLAN, supra note 97, at 134, 143 (noting that in April 1834, the House of
Representatives voted against rechartering the Bank, sealing its fate).
100. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives in Opposition to the
Bank Bill, in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 375–76 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
1981) (“If Congress could incorporate a Bank, . . . Congress might even establish
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3. The Commerce Clause
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution empowers Congress
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”101 These sixteen words, known as
“the Commerce Clause,” form what has become the Constitution’s
broadest grant of regulatory power to the federal government. With
few exceptions, a general antebellum consensus acknowledged that
Congress should have plenary power to regulate relations, commercial
and otherwise, with foreign governments. But sharp controversies
arose over the breadth of Congress’s power to regulate commerce
“among the several states”—interstate commerce.
Today, well-established Supreme Court doctrine construes the
power to regulate interstate commerce as an authorization for
Congress to regulate all economic activity having a significant
aggregate effect on the interstate economy.102 In 1819, however, the
scope of the Commerce Clause was uncertain, and considerably
narrower. Many interpreters of the Constitution deemed “interstate
commerce” as restricted to actual buying-and-selling transactions that
crossed state lines.103 It was widely agreed that the commerce power
included a federal power to regulate navigation, but it was not certain
whether this was an implied power or instead fell within the definition
of commerce itself.104 Either way, commerce was defined so narrowly
as to exclude categories of economic activities such as manufacturing
and agriculture: even if the activities in question required purchases
of tools and supplies that moved interstate, and produced goods for
interstate markets, they were typically viewed as taking place in
between buying and selling transactions, and therefore not in

religious teachers in every parish, and pay them out of the Treasury of the United
States.”); see also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for
Establishing a National Bank, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (Julian P. Boyd &
Ruth W. Lester eds., 1974) (“To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially
drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of
power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995) (explaining
substantial effects test).
103. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, More on the Origins of the Fuller Court’s Jurisprudence:
Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power over Commerce and Manufacturing in NineteenthCentury Constitutional Law, 49 POL. RES. Q. 415, 423–24 (1996).
104. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (holding that Congress’
power to regulate interstate commerce encompasses the power to regulate navigation).

952

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:927

themselves commerce.105 Strict constructionists went so far as to argue
that even interstate and international transportation of people (as
opposed to goods) was not commerce.106
A fairly broad antebellum consensus maintained that interstate
commerce under the Articles of Confederation was hampered by
discriminatory regulations, taxes, and the lack of a uniform currency.
Merchants in states lacking ports for foreign commerce had to pay
tribute to those that did, through which their foreign imports had to
pass.107 As Madison put it, “New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia
and New York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North
Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding
at both arms.”108 To address these problems, the new Constitution
prohibited states from laying tonnage duties and using import and
export taxes as a source of revenue. Additionally, it authorized
Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.109 Some
constitutional interpreters, including Daniel Webster, viewed this
history as strong support for a dormant commerce power.110 To these
interpreters, the Commerce Clause was intended to create a domestic
free trade zone, unencumbered by state protectionism.111 This could
be accomplished by striking down state laws under a dormant
Commerce Clause, without the necessity—or even the desirability—of
active congressional intervention.112
At the same time, the potential breadth of the federal commerce
power did not go unnoticed. For example, advocates of a national
bank argued that a federal power to charter such a bank could be

105. See Gillman, supra note 103, at 423–24.
106. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 474 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
107. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 89 (1957).
108. Id.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3.
110. See, e.g., 11 DANIEL WEBSTER, THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER
14, 18–19 (1903) (contending in Gibbons that Congress had exclusive power over
commercial regulations, but states maintained the power to enact regulations that
were more akin to regulations of police and only incidentally affected commerce).
111. See George L. Haskins, John Marshall and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 26–28 (1955).
112. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (commerce
regulation “produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by
changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it
has operated”); id. at 18 (“All useful regulation does not consist in restraint; and that
which Congress sees fit to leave free, is a part of its regulation, as much as the rest.”).
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implied from the Commerce Clause.113 More generally, as Webster
observed in his oral argument in Gibbons: “Almost all the business and
intercourse of life may be connected, incidentally, more or less, with
commercial regulations.”114 Recognition of this fact could give extensive
implied legislative powers to Congress, or equally extensive exclusive
effect on state laws.
B. Constitutional Politics
Constitutional law has never existed as an autonomous thing; rather,
it is a set of abstractions that mediate and negotiate the forces of
constitutional politics. The two most contested issues in the
antebellum era were slavery and the “American System.” The latter
was an economic development program that included proposals for
internal improvements, a national bank, and tariffs.115 Advocates of
the American System believed that congressional power over these
things could be implied from the Commerce Clause.116 But a broad
commerce power could be construed to preempt state laws permitting
or prohibiting slavery. And the antennae of sensitive pro-slavery
constitutionalists picked up alarming signals from McCulloch’s notion
of implied powers.117 In sum, the scope of the commerce power, and
the problem of concurrent powers, brooded over the constitutional
politics of the latter half of the Marshall Court era, when both
McCulloch and Gibbons were decided.
1. Slavery
Under the antebellum Constitution, the institution of slavery had
three constitutionally relevant aspects: the slave trade, the state’s
internal policies governing slavery and race, and the extension of
slavery to new territories and states.
The international slave trade carried the stink of a violation of
international law and was unpopular even with slave states that, like
113. See infra text accompanying notes 187–190.
114. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9–10.
115. CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 250–51.
116. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 48–49.
117. See, e.g., JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS
VINDICATED 294–300 (1820) (connecting McCulloch, the Bank, and implied powers
with the movement to prohibit slavery in new states); Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays
III, Richmond Enquirer, June 18, 1819, reprinted in GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 129
(criticizing McCulloch for authorizing “the representatives of Connecticut in
[C]ongress . . . to make laws, on the subject of our negro population”).
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Virginia, saw themselves as having a large stake in interstate
importation of slaves.118 A broad consensus to ban the importation of
slaves from abroad existed in 1787 to such an extent that South
Carolina and Georgia had to bargain (albeit not very hard) for a
twenty-year moratorium on a congressional prohibition of that odious
trade.119 This was set forth in the Constitution’s “Migration or
Importation” Clause.120 Congress acted promptly against the foreign
slave trade, even to regulate it short of a ban prior to 1808. President
Jefferson’s annual message to Congress in December 1806 included a
pointed reminder of the January 1, 1808 expiration of the
constitutional prohibition, and, in March 1807, nine months before
the ban would expire, Congress made it a crime, effective January 1,
1808, “to import or bring into the United States or the territories
thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro,
mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of
such [person] . . . as a slave, to be held to service or labour.”121
The Migration or Importation Clause’s delay of a slave-importation
ban implies that Congress would otherwise have the power to impose
one: that is, the Framers understood importing slaves to be “Commerce
with foreign Nations.”122 This understanding was amply confirmed by
federal navigation restrictions on slave trading. In 1794, Congress
passed a law that made it illegal to fit out any ship for the importation of
slaves, prohibited ships sailing from U.S. ports from slave trafficking
abroad, and strictly regulated the size of ships transporting slaves in the
coasting trade.123 If the international slave trade was understood to be
foreign commerce, then the buying and selling slaves, like any other
buying or selling, was commerce. By extension of this principle to
interstate commerce, the interstate slave trade could be regulated or
prohibited by Congress under the Commerce Clause.

118. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 28 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001).
119. Id. at 33–37.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (proclaiming that while Congress shall not prohibit
the migrating or importing of “Persons” within the States before 1808, Congress may
impose a maximum importation tax of ten dollars for each “Person”).
121. Prohibition on Slave Importations Act of 1807, Pub. L. No. 9-22, 2 Stat. 426
(1807); 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 11–15 (1806).
122. See, e.g., DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE POWER: HOW THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED TO THE CIVIL WAR 17–19 (2006).
123. See, e.g., Slave Trade Act of 1794, Pub. L. No. 3-11, 1 Stat. 347, 347–49 (1794).
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What other regulation of slavery might be authorized under an
interstate commerce power? Even if one defines commerce as limited
to the buying and selling of goods, the relationship between slavery
and commerce is direct and obvious. In theory, Congress could have
regulated commerce in the narrowest sense—provided the “rule” for
the buying and selling of goods—by prohibiting the interstate buying
and selling of slave-made goods. Even though Congress did not enact
such a law on this pattern until the Child Labor Act of 1916,124 it seems
highly unlikely that such a law was beyond the imagination of the
antebellum legal mind.
Whatever disagreements may have existed over specific applications,
the consensus opinion in the early nineteenth century recognized that
the Interstate Commerce Clause was designed to empower Congress to
maintain a level playing field for interstate trade.125 Some interpreters
would have limited this to the prohibition of state protectionism, but it
did not escape notice that plantation-based slave labor offered certain
competitive advantages in agricultural production over freehold
agriculture. That awareness, far more than human rights consciousness,
fueled the engine of anti-slavery politics in the antebellum era.126
Yet mainstream antebellum constitutional thought did not reason
abstractly from a commerce power to develop theories of how slavery
might be regulated—or abolished—under the Commerce Clause.
Abolitionists made limited forays in this direction, but abolitionism was
a fringe movement with little political clout.127 More typically,
antebellum constitutionalists reasoned in the other direction: starting
from the bedrock assumption that slavery was a decision to be made in
the first instance by state governments, the commerce power had to be
interpreted accordingly.128 Thus, a 1794 petition to Congress by
Pennsylvania abolitionists, led by Benjamin Franklin, was rebuffed with
a House resolution stating that “Congress have no authority to interfere
in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of
124. Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916). The Supreme Court struck down this
law in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918).
125. Even the pro-slavery Taney Court believed this. See, e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852).
126. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 54–55 (1988).
127. Id. at 61; see also LIGHTNER, supra note 122, at 38.
128. See infra Section V.A.; cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842)
(describing the fugitive slave clause as “so vital to the preservation of [the slave states’]
domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a
fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed”).
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the States; it remaining with the several States alone to provide any
regulations therein, which humanity and true policy may require.”129
Most antebellum constitutional interpreters took for granted that the
“purely internal” buying and selling of slaves within a state fell outside
the enumerated commerce power. The same could be said for slave
labor. To preserve this understanding required limiting the definition
of commerce and the extent of powers that could be implied from the
Commerce Clause. Thus, for example, Jefferson and other shame-faced
slaveholders fretted continually that liberal construction of
congressional powers would permit the regulation of “agriculture.”130 If
we assume that Jefferson’s inability to distinguish yeoman farmers from
plantation slaveholders was merely deluded rather than disingenuous—
a huge benefit of the doubt—then his concern to prevent Congress from
regulating agriculture can be read as an anxiety that Congress would act
to shift wealth from that sector into manufacturing.131 But at least some
of Jefferson’s admirers undoubtedly used “agriculture” as a code word
for plantation-based slavery, while others were explicit in their concern
for the rights of slaveholders.132
The doctrine that slavery was a “municipal” matter within the
reserved powers of the states was not simply a southern doctrine.
Abolitionism was not a dominant view in most northern states, yet all the
states wanted to retain their powers to regulate race more broadly.133
Southern states enacted slave codes, which stripped slaves of rights and
imposed draconian behavioral restrictions on them.134 Northern states,
to be sure, enacted laws to keep slaves out and to resist cooperating with
slave catchers who were pursuing alleged runaways into free states under
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.135 But some northern states also enacted
129. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1472–74 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
130. See, e.g., 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1139–40 (1818) (statement of Rep. Smyth) (“If reasons
like these will justify the exercise of power, then Congress may regulate agriculture . . .”).
131. Cf. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164–65 (William Peden
ed., 1982) (admiring the yeoman farmer by professing “[t]hose who labour in the
earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he
has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue” yet distancing the
benefits of manufacturing by writing “for the general operations of manufacture, let
our work-shops remain in Europe”).
132. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 118, at 214–15.
133. See id. at 28, 214–16.
134. See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, & ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 9–
11 (1853) (discussing codes from South Carolina, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Maryland).
135. Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 118, at 214–17.
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laws that restricted the rights of free blacks.136 The cultural, and in slave
states legal, presumption that a black person was a slave meant that a
black person not enslaved required an extra identifying adjective “free”
to be known in the language, and had no rights by default, as white
persons did, but rather only those rights enacted in positive law.137
Northern states increasingly viewed national power as a threat to their
own municipal institutions since the national government tended to be
solicitous to slaveholding interests.138
The understanding of slavery as a reserved state power was so strong
that it stunted the development of a doctrine of federal power over the
interstate slave trade. Although abolitionists advanced such a doctrine in
the 1830s and 1840s, the idea never attracted more than fringe support in
Congress, and thus never found its way into law.139 When the Supreme
Court finally reached this issue in the 1840s, the Justices endorsed what
amounted to a slavery exception to the Commerce Clause.140 Although
explicit discussion of a commerce power over the interstate slave trade
came later, it is nevertheless likely that in 1819 this question too may have
been a source of some anxiety in constitutional politics.
The question of Congress’s power to prohibit slavery in the
territories proved to be the most contentious question in antebellum
slavery politics and ultimately the primary dispute leading to southern
secession and the Civil War.141 Opposition to the expansion of slavery
into the territories was far broader in northern states than
abolitionism. Many who were quite happy to make common cause with
southerners on most political issues, and to tolerate slavery within the
states where it existed, were opposed to its territorial expansion. The
idea that new territories and states should be reserved for free white
labor, free from the burden of economic competition with slave
agriculture and status competition with the social pretensions of slave
owners, was compatible with the most virulent white racism.142
By 1819, two features of the question of slavery in the territories had
become obvious facts of American politics. First, if slavery were permitted
136. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–
1860 66–69 (1961).
137. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (holding that under the
Constitution, African Americans “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”).
138. See LITWACK, supra note 136, at 5.
139. See LIGHTNER, supra note 122, at 90–112.
140. See infra Section V.A.
141. See MCPHERSON, supra note 126, at 52–58.
142. Id. at 52–55.
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to take root during the settlement phase of a territory, that territory would
apply for statehood under the aegis of a pro-slavery state constitution and
would be admitted as a slave state.143 Second, slave states were
disproportionately represented in national politics. Not only was each
new state entitled to two Senators despite the relatively small populations
of new states, but slaveholding representation was further enhanced in
the House and the electoral college by the “three-fifths clause,” the
Constitution’s “federal formula” which counted slaves as three-fifths of a
person for purposes of determining population-based electoral
representation.144 Accordingly, there were high political stakes involved
in the question of Congress’s power to prohibit slavery in the territories.
The territorial question had not generated extensive controversy
prior to 1819. But when Missouri applied to Congress for statehood in
December 1818 with a pro-slavery constitution, its admission would
upset the existing balance of eleven slave and eleven free states,
thereby creating a majority of slave states for the first time since New
Jersey abolished slavery in 1804.145 To prevent this, Representative
Tallmadge of New York introduced an amendment to the Missouri
admission bill in February 1819 to condition Missouri’s entry into the
Union on its abolishing slavery in its state constitution.146 This touched
off an intense national debate that was not resolved until the Missouri
Compromise of 1820. The basic features of the Missouri Compromise
provided that Missouri would be admitted as a slave state, but that
slavery would be prohibited in the remainder of the Louisiana territory
north of the 36° 30 latitude line. In addition, the district of Maine,
ceded by Massachusetts, would be admitted as a free state, preserving
the balance in the Senate between slave and free states.147
The Missouri debate opened just a few days before oral argument in
McCulloch. The floor debate in the Senate was going on literally right
above the Justices’ heads in late February and early March 1819—the

143. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815–1848 137 (2007); see also MCPHERSON, supra note 126, at 52 (“Of the
congressmen who spoke on [slavery spreading], more than half expressed confidence
(if southern) or fear (if northern) that slavery would go into the new territories if
allowed to do so.”).
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
145. HOWE, supra note 143, at 147–54.
146. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1166 (1819).
147. An Act for the Admission of the state of Maine into the Union, 1 Stat. 544 (1820);
see also HOWE, supra note 143, at 119–20. Missouri itself was an exception to this
compromise line, since that latitude represented the state’s southern boundary. Id.
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Supreme Courtroom’s ceiling was the Senate’s floor.148 Plainly, the
Justices must have been aware of this debate when they decided
McCulloch. Did it influence the decision? The most immediately
relevant constitutional provisions to the Missouri debate were only
tangentially relevant to McCulloch.149 But, the question of implied
commerce powers might have been seen as having implications for a
congressional power to regulate slavery.
2. Internal improvements
At least as dominant as the slavery question in antebellum
constitutional politics was a long-running debate over “internal
improvements.” This term covered what we now call “infrastructure.”
In the nineteenth century internal improvements involved the
building or maintenance of roads, canals, bridges, navigable
waterways, navigation facilities; and, later in the century, railroads and
telegraphs.150 Internal improvements formed a key element of the
American System, a broad program for national economic
development that also included a national bank and protective tariffs.
The American System was advocated by constitutional nationalists, most
notably Henry Clay, congressman and later Senator from Kentucky, and
was opposed by defenders of states’ rights.151
While internal
improvements projects raised policy questions—such as feasibility,
economic justification, and fairness in their distribution of benefits—
they were often debated as the constitutional question of whether the
federal government had the power to engage in the projects.152
A state’s power to improve its internal infrastructure was undoubted,
and states undertook many such projects—the Erie Canal being the

148. See The Old Supreme Court Chamber: 1810–1860, SENATE, https://www.senate.
gov/artandhistory/art/resources/pdf/Old_Supreme_Court.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
149. The Missouri debate centered on the Territories and New States clauses. See U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.”);
id. cl. 2 (granting Congress the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”); see also
CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 235–45. Application of these clauses did
not raise issues of implied powers or the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
150. Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding
Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 400, 433 (2015).
151. See CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 250; HOWE, supra note 143, at
202–84; LaCroix, supra note 150, at 400.
152. CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 258–59.
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most famous example.153 But state-managed internal improvements
were not enough for American System proponents. States often lacked
the money to pursue ambitious internal improvement projects.
Sometimes they lacked the self-interest. For example, a road through a
state or a canal connecting navigable waterways might disproportionately
benefit the terminal points of the route without significantly benefiting
the states in between. States dominated by elite plantation-owners were
often reluctant to raise tax revenues to improve the commercial
opportunities for smallholding farmers or local merchants.154 Thus,
advocates of internal improvements had good reasons to believe that
federal involvement was essential to make up for state lassitude in
pursuing infrastructure projects.
Despite the clear connection between internal improvements and
various enumerated powers, particularly the commerce power, the federal
power over internal improvements remained highly contested throughout
the antebellum period.155 Opponents of internal improvements legislation
tended to make strict constructionist arguments against implied powers
and in favor of narrow constructions of granted powers.156 The power to
establish post roads was not a power to build them, they argued, but merely
a power to designate existing roads and reserve the right to traverse them.157
Further, the power “to regulate commerce” meant only a power to
“prescribe the manner, terms, and conditions, on which that commerce
should be carried on,” not a power to promote commerce.158 Under this
crabbed view, Congress had no peacetime power to build roads, and the war
powers could not justify building roads when there was no war on.159 Both

153. See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573–75 (1852) (affirming state
police power over internal improvements); BRIAN PHILLIPS MURPHY, BUILDING THE
EMPIRE STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 161–62 (2015) (describing
the importance of the Erie Canal).
154. See Aaron R. Hall, Reframing the Fathers’ Constitution: The Centralized State and
Centrality of Slavery in the Confederate Constitutional Order, 83 J. S. HIST. 255, 267 (2017).
155. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 47–50.
156. CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 258–59.
157. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal
Improvements, in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
1789–1897 144, 155–57 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
158. CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 263; see also Searight v. Stokes, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting); id. at 166 (majority opinion)
(declining to decide whether Congress has a power to build post roads); Monroe, supra
note 157, at 155–57; Gillman, supra note 105, at 422–23.
159. CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 263–64, 272–73.
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Presidents Madison, prior to McCulloch, and Monroe after it, issued
controversial vetoes of major internal improvements bills on such grounds.160
Nationalist proponents of the American System generally argued
that the constitutional authorization for Congress to undertake
internal improvements projects was implied by the commerce, postal,
or war powers. From the first Congress, the federal government had
built and maintained a nationwide system of aids to navigation,
creating a legislative precedent for internal improvements under the
commerce power, which was widely held to embrace navigation.161
This precedent also weighed in favor of a liberal construction of
commerce power to extend to facilitating commerce.162
The internal improvements debate did not occur in isolation, but
within a fabric of constitutional hopes and anxieties that included slavery
and a concern that federal powers might constitutionally exclude parallel
state powers, and thereby negate swaths of state police regulation. Many
legal thinkers viewed a power over internal improvements as a threat to
the states’ internal regulatory system in general, and its regulation of
slavery in particular.163 The building of a federal road could quite literally
make an inroad into state jurisdiction. Interestingly, many states’ rights
advocates viewed overland internal improvements as more threatening
than those confined to shores and waterways. As late as the 1870s, the
Supreme Court continued to draw this distinction. In upholding
congressional authority in a case that “relates to transportation on the
navigable waters of the United States,” the Justices were “not called upon
to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over interstate
commerce when carried on by land transportation.”164
No case directly ruling on the constitutionality of internal
improvements ever came before the Marshall Court. But between the
Court’s decisions in McCulloch (1819) and Gibbons (1824), an important
160. Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill on March 3, 1817, his last day in office. See
Monroe, supra note 157, at 584; see also LaCroix, supra note 150, at 412 (describing
President Madison’s veto as a “forceful refutation” of congressional plans to maintain
discrete funds for internal improvements). President Monroe vetoed the Cumberland
Road bill in 1822. See infra notes 165–170 and accompanying text (explaining the
reasoning for vetoing the Cumberland Road bill).
161. CURRIE, FEDERALIST PERIOD, supra note 85, at 69–70.
162. Arguing against a narrow construction of “regulate” in the commerce clause,
Representative Daniel Sheffey of Virginia asserted that “the word ‘regulate’” means
“an entire control over the subject in all its relations.” CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS,
supra note 83, at 262.
163. See id.; LIGHTNER, supra note 122, at 57; see also infra Section V.A.
164. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (11 Wall.) 557, 565–66 (1870).
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episode occurred in the constitutional history of internal improvements,
one that reveals that Marshall and his colleagues were ambivalent on this
question. At best, they took a cautious view toward internal improvements
and did not believe that Congress had the power to build roads and canals
as part of an implied power to regulate or promote commerce.
In May 1822, President Monroe vetoed the Cumberland Road Tollgate
bill,165 a major piece of internal improvements legislation. The
Cumberland (or National) Road was one of the largest internal
improvement projects undertaken in the nation’s first half-century.
Started during the Jefferson administration, this multi-year federal project
contemplated an interstate highway from Maryland to Ohio.166 In the
early 1800s, this would have been as big a deal as the transcontinental
railroad in the mid-nineteenth century, or the interstate highway system
in the mid-twentieth century. The Cumberland Road was still incomplete
by 1822, and its completed sections were in serious need of repair.
Congress passed a bill to erect tollgates on the Cumberland Road and use
the tolls to preserve and repair the road. An additional provision of the
bill would make it a federal crime to evade the duty to pay the tolls.167
Though the federal government’s supervision would be a novelty, the use
of tollgates for road revenues was long established on public and private
roads within the states.
In an unusual step, Monroe supplemented his veto message by
issuing a 29,000 word pamphlet explaining his views.168 Monroe’s main
objection was that a power to build and regulate a federal road, by
cutting across dry land, implied a “system of internal improvement,”
requiring a constellation of powers that he believed Congress did not
have.169 These powers extended beyond merely charting and
constructing the road, to include also the powers to condemn the
underlying land; to build tollgates or houses and collect tolls; and to
assert federal criminal jurisdiction over the road (to protect the road
from toll evasion, wanton infliction of damage, and presumably
robbery of passengers).170 Without naming the case, Monroe flagrantly
disregarded McCulloch’s formulation regarding implied powers and
the Necessary and Proper Clause: “Whatever is absolutely necessary to

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

CURRIE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 83, at 279.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 279.
See Monroe, supra note 157, at 144.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 155–56.
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the accomplishment of the object of the grant [of power to Congress],
though not specified, may fairly be considered as included in it.
Beyond this the doctrine of incidental power cannot be carried.”171
McCulloch had expressly rejected the “absolutely necessary”
interpretation of implied powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.172 President Monroe went on to offer stingy interpretations of
enumerated powers, rejecting the war, postal, territories, and
commerce powers as grounds from which a road-building or internal
improvements power could be implied.173 He asserted an extreme
states’ rights interpretation of the Commerce Clause, arguing that it
authorized Congress to regulate interstate commerce only incidentally
to regulating foreign commerce.174
Nevertheless, Monroe wanted federal participation in some sort of
road-building program.175 Presiding over a period of virtual single
party rule by Jeffersonian Republicans, now known as the “Era of Good
Feelings,” Monroe was not inattentive to the aspirations of American
System proponents within the nationalist wing of his party. He thus
offered a compromise solution. The federal government could pay for
roads and other internal improvements under the spending power, so
long as those projects served “great national” rather than “strictly local”
purposes; the federal government simply could not regulate the roads
thus built.176 This position eventually became Jacksonian orthodoxy,
embraced by President Jackson and the Taney Court.177
III. MCCULLOCH, GIBBONS AND THE NON-EMERGENCE
OF IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS
Since the early decades of the twentieth century, constitutional scholars
have taken for granted that McCulloch and Gibbons, the Marshall Court’s
“two great nationalism decisions,” establish the constitutional foundation
for the broad legislative powers that Congress has enjoyed since 1937. This
interpretation, while containing elements of truth, overlooks significant
cross-currents and ambiguities that must be examined to understand the
171. Id. at 158.
172. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414, 419 (1819).
173. Monroe, supra note 157, at 157–62.
174. Id. at 162.
175. See id. at 167, 176–77 (“Good roads and canals will promote many very
important national purposes.”).
176. Id. at 167.
177. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 179 (1845); HOWE, supra note 143, at
360–66 (noting Jackson’s frequent approval of internal improvements spending projects).
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long-running judicial resistance to implied commerce powers. Read in the
context of antebellum constitutional law and politics, McCulloch and Gibbons
are more ambiguous with respect to national powers than the conventional
interpretation acknowledges. To see this requires examining two questions
that have not been answered, or indeed even asked, by students of the
Marshall Court. First, why didn’t McCulloch uphold the Second Bank of the
United States as an exercise of an implied power to regulate commerce?
Second, why didn’t Gibbons refer to McCulloch or even suggest that
regulation of navigation was a power implied from the Commerce Clause
rather than an element of the definition of commerce itself? As will be
seen, the most plausible answer is that the Marshall Court, probably
consciously, shied away from embracing the full reach of McCulloch in the
form of implied commerce powers.
A. McCulloch v. Maryland
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch is well known to everyone with a
legal education.178 The Court unanimously struck down a Maryland
law that attempted to tax the operations of the Second Bank of the
United States.179 The second part of the two-part opinion held that
states could not tax federal instrumentalities, here a private-public
corporation chartered by Congress to help carry out the federal
government’s fiscal operations.180 Since everyone involved in the case
assumed that the Bank’s quasi-governmental character depended on
Congress’s power to charter the bank, the constitutionality of the
charter was treated as a threshold question in the opinion’s first part.181
After observing that the constitutionality of the Bank had been settled
by longstanding legislative practice and acceptance by the political
branches, Marshall’s opinion went on to offer an independent,
confirmatory analysis. Since the power to incorporate a bank was not
expressly granted, Marshall had to inquire whether a Bank could be
chartered under Congress’s implied powers.182 These implied powers
encompassed unwritten means to execute the enumerated powers and
are necessary to the constitutional order, Marshall argued, because a
constitution cannot specify in detail all the different legislative ways

178. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 987 (1998) (identifying McCulloch as “that most canonical of constitutional cases”).
179. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
180. Id. at 435.
181. Id. at 401–25.
182. Id. at 405–08.
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and means to carry out its granted powers. Nor can implied powers be
limited to those without which an expressly granted power would be
nugatory; rather, Congress must have discretion to choose among any
means convenient or plainly adapted to implementing the granted
power.183 Reading the Constitution in the narrower sense would
undermine its adaptability to unforeseen crises and its ability to endure
over time.184 These principles are implicit in the nature of the
Constitution, Marshall asserted, and for good measure they are
confirmed by the Necessary and Proper Clause. That clause was not
intended by the framers to narrow the granted powers, but to confirm
the existence of implied powers.185
Marshall ultimately concluded that the Bank is constitutional because
“it is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument” in conducting the
national government’s “fiscal operations.”186 He did not say it was
necessary and proper to Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce. This omission, in light of the available arguments, is striking.
1. The National Bank and implied commerce power
The constitutionality of the 1791 bill proposing to charter the First Bank
of the United States was debated extensively in Congress and in President
Washington’s cabinet. Among the arguments for constitutionality, which
included references to the taxing, borrowing, and war powers, supporters
of the Bank argued that the bank was warranted by implied commerce
powers.187 The existence of such powers had been acknowledged from
earlier legislation taxing and regulating navigation and constructing
lighthouses.188 The bill was approved by Congress, and President
Washington asked his cabinet—Secretary of State Jefferson, Attorney
General Randolph, and Treasury Secretary Hamilton—to advise him on
its constitutionality.189 Jefferson and Randolph argued that it was
unconstitutional;190 but, Hamilton convinced Washington otherwise.
Among other points, Hamilton argued that the power to charter a
national bank was also implied from the commerce clause, having “a

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 407–08.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 418–20.
Id. at 422; see also Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 15–16.
CURRIE, THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, supra note 85, at 79.
Id.
4 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 393–95 (rev. ed. 1926).
Opinion on Constitutionality, supra note 87, at 126–27.
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natural relation to the regulation of trade between the States.”191 The
bank’s activities are “to be regarded as a regulation of trade” by providing
“facilities to circulation and a convenient medium of exchange [and]
alienation” and by promoting economic development.192
By the time McCulloch was argued in the Supreme Court, these
arguments were well known to Marshall and his colleagues. Marshall
researched the debates in both Congress and Washington’s cabinet
when writing his Life of George Washington, published in four volumes
between 1804 and 1807.193 He described these sources in detail,
observing that the Bank’s proponents had argued, among other things
that “[i]n all commercial countries [banks] had been resorted to as an
instrument of great efficacy in mercantile transactions[.]”194
At the McCulloch oral argument, the lawyers for both sides paid
significant attention to the Commerce Clause as a potential basis for
decision.195 All three of the Bank’s counsel argued that chartering a
bank was an appropriate means of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce.196 According to William Pinkney, the Bank’s lead counsel,
the Bank had “a close connection with the power of regulating foreign
commerce, and that between the different States” by “provid[ing] a
circulating medium, by which that commerce can be more conveniently
carried on, and exchanges may be facilitated.”197 For the Bank’s
opponents, acknowledging an implied power to regulate commerce
through a national bank charter would lead to a parade of commerceregulation horribles. Walter Jones for Maryland warned that only
measures “indispensably necessary” to commerce regulation could be
implied under the Commerce Clause, lest a broader view of implied
powers be construed to authorize the establishment of “an East or a West
India company, with the exclusive privilege of trading with those parts
of the world[.]”198 Worse, if Congress could incorporate a bank to
regulate commerce, it could “create corporations for the purpose of
constructing roads and canals; a power to construct which has been also
lately discovered among other secrets of the constitution, developed by
191. Id. at 126.
192. Id. at 126–27.
193. MARSHALL, supra note 189, at 392–94.
194. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
195. See Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 54–55.
196. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 325 (1819) (argument of
Webster); id. at 353–54 (argument of Wirt); id. at 385–86, 388–89 (argument of Pinkney).
197. Id. at 389.
198. Id. at 365, 367.
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this dangerous doctrine of implied powers.”199 But, Pinkney responded
that congressional precedent had rejected the “indispensably necessary”
standard for implied powers under the Commerce Clause: “light
houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers, have all been established
under the general power to regulate commerce.”200 Because “they are
not indispensably necessary to commerce,” the precedent demonstrated
a congressional understanding that implied powers extended beyond
the narrow confines of indispensably necessary measures.201
2. Avoiding the Commerce Clause in McCulloch
Among McCulloch’s more intriguing and perplexing features is
Marshall’s caginess about actually identifying one or more enumerated
powers from which the power to incorporate a bank can be implied.
Throughout the opinion, Marshall refers to several enumerated
powers, but on closer inspection, one sees that none of these were
identified as the textual source for an implied power to incorporate a
bank. In the end, Marshall upheld the Bank as “a convenient, a useful,
and essential instrument in the prosecution of [the national
government’s] fiscal operations,” cutting off further explanation with
the assertion that a longstanding consensus of financially-inclined
“statesmen” made it unnecessary “to enter into any discussion” of the
point.202 Marshall mentioned the Commerce Clause (indeed, the word
“commerce”) only twice in the entire opinion.203 In both instances,
Marshall was making a general point about the nature of implied
powers rather than identifying which enumerated powers were the
basis for an implied power to incorporate a bank.204
Marshall’s evasiveness has largely, though not entirely, escaped
notice. In a pseudonymous editorial attack on McCulloch, written in
late spring 1819, Spencer Roane charged that “[the Bank’s] friends
have not yet agreed upon the particular power to which it is to be
attached!”205 A handful of modern scholars have echoed this
observation.
Historian David Currie, for instance, expressed
exasperation that “Marshall never bothered to explain how the

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 368.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 407, 411.
Id. at 407–09, 411; see Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch, supra note 98, at 60–61.
GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 133.
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establishment of the Bank was necessary, proper, or even conducive to
the execution of any of the powers expressly granted to Congress.”206
The most obvious way to ground the Bank in the enumerated powers
would have been to rely on the Commerce Clause. Marshall could
have cited the Commerce Clause either by itself or as a first among
equals in a list of powers from which a bank-chartering power could
have been implied. Not only were the arguments clearly laid out for
Marshall by the advocates, but they were also obvious from a historical
record with which he was thoroughly familiar.
B. Gibbons v. Ogden
Gibbons v. Ogden is conventionally understood as the other of
Marshall’s two great affirmative nationalism cases. But like McCulloch,
Gibbons is only somewhat nationalistic in its leaning, and through a
combination of Marshallian caginess, limited willingness to commit
himself, and incompletely worked-out doctrinal thinking, Gibbons
contains important ambiguities.
1. The Gibbons Litigation
The litigation in Gibbons arose out of more than a decade of legal
wrangling over the rights to operate steam-powered vessels on the
Hudson River. Steamboat technology, by enabling travel against the
current of navigable rivers, the main interstate highways in the early
nineteenth century, held the potential to revolutionize interstate
commerce and offered potentially enormous profits to holders of stateissued monopolies like the partnership of Robert Livingston and Robert
Fulton.207 Livingston, a statesman with great political influence in New
York, and Fulton, an engineer who had made advances in steamboat
technology, had won such a monopoly from the New York legislature.
After losing a legal battle challenging the monopoly, Aaron Ogden
purchased a license from the Livingston-Fulton partnership to operate a
lucrative steamboat passenger service between New York City and
Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Thomas Gibbons, a former partner of
Ogden’s who was now feuding with him, began running his own
steamboats on that route, and Ogden sued to enjoin Gibbons from
continuing to do so.208 The chancery court issued the injunction, and the
206. CURRIE, THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, supra note 85, at 80.
207. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS V. OGDEN: JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS, AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE 28 (2010); Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 579–82.
208. JOHNSON, supra note 207, at 28–29.
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decision was upheld in the chancery appellate court by the renowned
Chancellor James Kent.209 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.210
On behalf of Gibbons, Daniel Webster and U.S. Attorney General
William Wirt made a two-pronged argument. First, the power to
regulate navigation fell within an exclusive federal commerce power—
the dormant Commerce Clause.
Federal exclusivity made it
unconstitutional for a state to regulate any aspect of navigation, such
as issuing the steamboat monopoly.211 Second, Gibbons was in
possession of a federal license to engage in the coasting trade,
pursuant to a 1793 statute entitled, “An act for enrolling and licensing
ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries,
and for regulating the same” (Coastal Act).212 The prima facie purpose
of the license was to identify American-owned vessels, which were
entitled to lower tonnage and import duties than foreign-owned
ones.213 But, Gibbons’ lawyers argued that the federal license gave its
holder a federal right to engage in coastal navigation. As such, the
state monopoly conflicted with the federal license and was therefore
void under the Supremacy Clause.214
Significantly, Ogden’s lawyer, Thomas Oakley, did not challenge
Congress’s commerce power to enact the coasting license law. Rather,
he argued that the power to regulate navigation was an implied
commerce power, and that “[a]ll implied powers are, of course,
concurrent,” because to hold otherwise “would deprive the States
almost entirely of sovereignty, as these implied powers must inevitably
be very numerous, and must embrace a wide field of legislation.”215 In
other words, the broad potential scope of implied powers would, if
deemed exclusive, preempt an unacceptably wide swath of state laws.
The state therefore had to be deemed to hold the concurrent power
to regulate navigation, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause. Nor
did the coasting law conflict with the state’s concurrent power to
regulate navigation because Congress did not intend that the license
convey a general freedom from state regulation when plying navigable
waterways. Oakley was probably right on this point: the Coasting Act

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See id. at 27–37; Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 579–82.
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 581.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824).
Id. at 2; see also 1 Stat. 305 (1793).
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 22; 1 Stat. 305, 307–08.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 25–27.
Id.
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had been widely understood to exempt U.S. license-holders from
“tonnage” duties imposed on foreign vessels, rather than to create a
nationwide free-navigation zone. Chancellor Kent had endorsed that
limited interpretation of the Coasting Act in the lower court.216
But Marshall struck down the New York steamboat monopoly by
adopting Gibbons’ strained interpretation of the coasting license as a
free navigation permit. He might have done so by rejecting Oakley’s
contention that all implied powers are concurrent, such that the
exercise of a federal power over nautical traffic was field preemptive.
Or, he could have simply pointed out that a federal free trade license
conflicted with a state monopoly grant. Marshall could have reached
either of these analytical pathways by asserting, with little discussion, that
a power to regulate navigation was necessary and proper to the
regulation of trade—that is, an implied commerce power. Instead,
Marshall deemed it important to hold that navigation was not an implied
commerce power, but rather was entailed by the definition of commerce:
[C]ounsel for the appellee would limit [commerce regulation] to
traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities,
and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would
restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its
significations.
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating
commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning
navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of
the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to
prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual
employment of buying and selling, or of barter.217

This language supplies the core of Gibbons’ famous holding, and postNew Deal courts and commentators have interpreted this passage as
committing American constitutional law to a broad construction of the
Commerce Clause.218 It is noteworthy that the language misleadingly
implies that Ogden’s lawyers argued that Congress lacked the commerce
power to regulate navigation. But that was not true: recall that Oakley
216. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 608.
217. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–90.
218. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (Gibbons “described the
federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded”); Primus, The Limits of
Enumeration, supra note 17, at 614.
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merely asserted that congressional control over navigation was an
implied, rather than express power; that exercises of implied federal
powers were not per se exclusive; and that the Coastal Act did not
conflict with the steamboat monopoly.
Although the case was ultimately decided on statutory grounds, the
core of both sides’ arguments focused on whether the Commerce Clause
in its dormant state precluded the New York law.219 Marshall discussed
this argument at length and seemed ready to adopt it, but, ultimately
relied on a statutory preemption analysis arising out of the Coasting Act,
which would have been unnecessary under a commerce exclusivity
disposition.220 Scholars have debated for decades why Marshall flirted so
extensively with commerce exclusivity only to veer away at the last
moment.221 This puzzle is wrapped in the (unnoticed) enigma of
Marshall’s decision to ignore McCulloch and implied commerce powers.
2. Avoiding implied powers (1): navigation is commerce
Marshall introduced the famous “commerce is . . . intercourse”
passage quoted above with this language: “The subject to be regulated
is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar,
one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of
the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word.”222
Subsequent commentators have overlooked the self-contradiction in
this curious passage: according to Marshall, commerce can’t be
defined—so, he says, let’s define it. What “was aptly said at the bar”
was Daniel Webster’s argument that:
It was in vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the powers of
Congress, on several subjects. The constitution did not undertake the
task of making such exact definitions. In conferring powers, it
proceeded in the way of enumeration, stating the powers conferred,
one after another, in few words; and, where the power was general, or
complex in its nature, the extent of the grant must necessarily be
judged of, and limited, by its object, and by the nature of the power.223

Webster expressly asked the Court not to define commerce, but to
find it exclusive in any case in which a state law affected the uniformity
219. See Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1415 (2004) (arguing
that statutory argument was a throw-in by counsel).
220. Id. at 209–21.
221. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY,
AND WAITE 16–17 (1937); Williams, supra note 219, passim.
222. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189.
223. WEBSTER, supra note 110, at 10–11.
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of interstate trade.224 The purpose of the Commerce Clause, and
indeed an overriding purpose of meeting in convention to draft the
new Constitution, Webster argued, was to get rid of the “divers
restrictions” by which states sought commercial advantage over one
another, and institute “an uniform and general system.”225 These
purposes, “[f]rom the very nature of the case,” could only be
maintained by an exclusive federal commerce power.226 The “very
object” of the Commerce Clause was “to take away” concurrent state
power to regulate interstate commerce.227 Because “monopolies of
trade and navigation” created disuniform commercial regulation, the
power to grant them “should not be considered as still retained by the
state.”228 In sum, Webster argued, because commerce regulation
potentially “cover[ed] a vast field of legislation,” it was better not to
define commerce but rather to apply exclusivity to any commercerelated matter where federal control could operate “with more
advantage” to “the public good.”229
It is more than curious that Marshall treated navigation as a matter of
the definition of commerce, rather than as an implied power under the
Commerce Clause. While perhaps not universal, it was certainly common
for founding era writers to refer to “commerce” and “navigation” as
distinct things.230 Similarly, while some members of Congress appeared
to view navigation as a regulation of commerce per se, it was also
commonplace to view the regulation of navigation as incidental to the
regulation of commerce.231 Indeed, navigation regulation was held up
time and again as a leading and uncontroversial illustration of the
constitutional existence of implied powers. Hamilton and members of
Congress arguing for the constitutionality of the first Bank had cited
federal laws erecting “lighthouses, beacons, buoys” and other navigation
224. Id. at 10–14.
225. Id. at 11, 13.
226. Id. at 13.
227. Id. at 13–14.
228. Id. at 14.
229. Id. at 14, 17.
230. For example, John Adams, writing to his wife Abigail, expressed the hope in
1780 that his sons would be free from the burden of studying “Politicks and War” in
order to study “Mathematicks and Philosophy, Geography, natural History, Naval
Architecture, navigation, Commerce and Agriculture.” Letter from John Adams to
Abigail Adams (May 12, 1780), in 3 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 342 (L.H.
Butterfield & Marc Friedlaender eds., 1973).
231. Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 125–30 (2001).
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aids as legislative precedent for an implied power pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.232 These legislative precedents were referred to
repeatedly both inside and outside Congress.233 Marshall and his judicial
colleague, William Johnson, both issued circuit court opinions identifying
navigation as an implied commerce power. Four years before Gibbons, in
The Wilson v. United States,234 Marshall had concluded that:
From the adoption of the constitution, till this time, the universal
sense of America has been, that the word “commerce,” as used in
that instrument, is to be considered a generic term, comprehending
navigation, or, that a control over navigation is necessarily incidental to the
power to regulate commerce.235

In Elkison v. Deliesseline (1823),236 Johnson stated that “the navigation
of ships has always been held, by all nations, to appertain to commercial
regulations.”237 The word “appertain” refers to implied powers.238 The
view that a federal power to regulate navigation could be implied under
the commerce power was so well-established by 1824 that counsel for
Ogden had to concede in the Gibbons oral argument that “laws
regulating light houses, buoys, &c. are all exercises of the implied
powers derived from that of regulating commerce.”239
Gibbons, then, presented Marshall with the opportunity not only to
reaffirm and build on McCulloch, but to endorse the idea of implied

232. See supra notes 187–192 and accompanying text.
233. As summarized in an 1808 district court decision, the term “commerce” in the
Constitution:
does not necessarily include shipping or navigation; much less does it include
the fisheries. Yet it never has been contended, that they are not the proper
objects of national regulation; and several acts of congress have been made
respecting them. It may be replied, that these are incidents to commerce, and
intimately connected with it; and that congress, in legislating respecting them,
act under the authority, given them by the constitution, to make all laws
necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the enumerated powers.
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 621 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700).
234. 30 F. Cas. 239, 243 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846).
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
237. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
238. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819) (“[T]he
power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised whenever the
sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers.”); A Friend of the
Constitution, in GUNTHER, supra note 46, at 171 (“An ‘incident,’ Hampden tells us, ‘is
defined, in the common law, to be a thing appertaining to, or following another, as
being more worthy or principal.’”).
239. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 117 (1824).
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commerce powers, with its hugely expansive potential for federal
legislative power. But, Marshall not only declined to cite McCulloch in his
Gibbons opinion; at times he wrote as if its implied powers holding did not
even exist. After his initial assertion that “commerce” means “commercial
intercourse,” Marshall argued that the term must include navigation,
because “[i]f commerce does not include navigation, the government of
the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law
prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be
navigated by American seamen.”240 This assertion makes no sense—indeed,
is plainly wrong—according to McCulloch’s understanding of implied
powers. Under McCulloch, the absence of a “direct” (read, enumerated)
power should not negate an implied power over navigation.
Marshall seemed to bend over backwards to view navigation regulation
as “direct” commerce regulation rather than an implied commerce
power. He claimed to find further proof that commerce includes
navigation in the 1807 Embargo Act.241 That act implemented President
Jefferson’s foreign policy of economic retaliation against Britain’s practice
of stopping U.S. merchant ships and impressing American sailors into
British naval service. “By its friends and its enemies,” Marshall argued, the
Embargo Act “was treated as a commercial, not as a war measure.”242 But
this passage only demonstrates that commerce regulation implies—rather
than definitionally includes—a power over navigation. An embargo is a
prohibition of trade: it forbids U.S. ships to carry trade goods to the target
nation, prohibits the target nation ships from landing in U.S. ports, and
authorizes the seizure of target nation ships in American territorial waters.
Such navigation regulations are auxiliary means to prevent the trading of
goods with the foreign nation. A power to impose an embargo merely
implies a power over navigation.
One might argue that an implied powers approach would have been
narrower than the definitional approach adopted by Marshall. Before
Gibbons, this argument would go, implied powers would be constrained
by the narrow “trade-only” understanding of commerce; after Gibbons,
implied powers can be attached to a broader base of a “trade-plusnavigation” definition of commerce. But consider how the Gibbons
opinion might have read if Marshall had built on McCulloch rather than
treating the issue as “one of definition” of the term “commerce.” The
240. Id. at 190.
241. Embargo Act of 1807, 2 Stat. 451, 451–52 (1807), repealed by Act of January 9,
1808, 2 Stat. 453 (1808); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190–93.
242. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 192.
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following hypothetical revision of Gibbons’ key language (indicated in
bold and strikeouts) illustrates my point:
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution
being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of
definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary
is vain to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the
appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends
navigation. This would unduly restrict a general term delegation of
power, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations
applications. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it the power of
Congress to regulate commerce is something much more: it is
intercourse. As this Court said in the case of McCulloch v. The State
of Maryland, the legislative powers of the government extend to all
legislative means, “which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted” to executing the enumerated powers; in this case, the
power to regulate trade among the states or with foreign nations or
Indian tribes. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. As was aptly said
at the bar, “[a]lmost all the business and intercourse of life may be
connected, incidentally, more or less, with commercial
regulations.”243 Whatever else may be comprehended by “that vast
mass of incidental powers which must be involved in” the regulation
of commerce, see McCulloch, those incidental powers over commerce
undoubtedly include the power to regulate navigation. The mind
can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between
nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation . . . .

By applying McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers to the Commerce
Clause in Gibbons, Marshall could have thrown the door open to a wide
array of legislative means deemed by Congress to be “appropriate” and
“plainly adapted” to the regulation of interstate trade. This could
extend to internal improvements, and the regulation of agriculture,
manufactures, and slavery. And that was precisely the problem.
Applying McCulloch to the Commerce Clause was too expansive for
Marshall. But by instead making the question turn on the definition
of commerce, Gibbons in effect, suggested that each assertion of
regulatory power onto a new object other than navigation (internal
improvements, agriculture, slavery) would require a new definitional
battle over the meaning of commerce. It is far easier to say that

243. This statement is taken from Webster’s argument. Id. at 9–10.

976

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:927

building roads is “plainly adapted” to regulating commerce than that
roadbuilding is commerce. At oral argument, Webster asserted that
road-building might be incidental to, but was not in itself, commerce
regulation.244 McCulloch’s implied powers analysis is based on a much
looser concept of relatedness than the addition of dictionary meanings
to a word or phrase. Moreover, Marshall in effect shifted the decision
from a deferentially-reviewed congressional determination of
“appropriate” or “plainly adapted” means to a rigorous judicial
determination of the definition of a word in the Constitution.
3. Avoiding implied powers (2): reaching “into the interior”
The question of implied powers arises not only in the relationship
between commerce and navigation, but also in the relationship
between interstate and intrastate commerce. The Commerce Clause
enumerates three federal commerce powers: over commerce (1) “with
foreign Nations,” (2) “among the several States,” and (3) “with the
Indian Tribes.”245 After noting this constitutional text, Marshall says:
the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to which the
power was to be extended, would not have been made, had the
intention been to extend the power to every description. The
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence,
must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.246

This raised a factual problem regarding the steamboat monopoly.
New York claimed that the Hudson River was an entirely New York
waterway, so that most of the route controlled by the monopoly was
intrastate. Its interstate element occurred only at the New Jersey ferry
terminal.247 Looked at one way, the monopoly regulated intrastate
commerce and only incidentally touched on interstate commerce, and
one possible resolution would have been to let the monopoly stand as
far as it concerned service entirely within New York. But, the Court
wanted to embrace Webster’s argument that intrastate sections of
navigable waterways could not be separated from the system of free
interstate navigation, which therefore had to be kept free even from
intrastate obstructions. “Every district has a right to participate in
244. Id. at 20 (“[G]enerally speaking, roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, of
course, they affect commerce and intercourse, do not obtain that importance and
elevation, as to be deemed commercial regulations.”).
245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
246. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194–95.
247. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 584 n.77, 597.
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[interstate commerce]. The deep streams which penetrate our country
in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the
Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right.”248 Thus,
Marshall had to say that federal commerce power could reach at least
some intrastate commerce.
In making this point, Marshall wrote two key passages whose ambiguity
charted the divergent course of Commerce Clause jurisprudence for the
next two centuries. The first defined the Constitution’s phrase
“commerce . . . among the several States.”249 Marshall began with the
crucial assertion that “Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the
interior.”250 But, he immediately shifted to defining the concept by
negative implication from reserved state powers:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that
commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the
same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.
Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one . . . . The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may
be considered as reserved for the State itself.251

On one hand, this passage suggests broadening federal powers, and
the Court 120 years later would turn this language into the substantial
effects test.252 On the other hand, the rhetorical emphasis is on restriction
of the federal power; note, too, the backhanded reference to McCulloch
in the negative form of the words “convenient” and “necessary.”
In the second key passage, Marshall argued at length that the state’s
power to inspect out-of-state trade goods did not demonstrate a state
power to regulate interstate commerce. State inspection laws were a
leading example of
that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within
the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government:
all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States
themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 194–95.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942).
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a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are
component parts of this mass.
No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress;
and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.253

Marshall hints that these are not utterly beyond the reach of Congress:
If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for
national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for
a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is
expressly given. It is obvious, that the government of the Union, in
the exercise of its express powers, that, for example, of regulating
commerce with foreign nations and among the States, may use
means that may also be employed by a State, in the exercise of its
acknowledged powers; that, for example, of regulating commerce
within the State.254

Here, Marshall reaffirmed the existence of implied powers in a general
way, albeit in the course of reaffirming the reserved powers of the states.
He also hints that implied powers can be applied to the Commerce Clause.
But the application of this principle is relatively narrow. He continues:
If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to another, in the same
State, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power
expressly granted to Congress, and implies no claim of a direct power
to regulate the purely internal commerce of a State, or to act directly
on its system of police. So, if a State, in passing laws on subjects
acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those
subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which
Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from the
particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which
remains with the State, and may be executed by the same means.255

Marshall’s general hints about implied commerce powers can be
read in a manner limited to the two main points Marshall was here
attempting to make. First, Marshall reasserted that commerce
regulation can cross state lines. Note that here he merely hinted, slyly,
that Congress had the power to regulate port-to-port intrastate
navigation, and did not clearly make that part of Gibbons’ holding. He
left that to follow-up litigation in the New York courts.256 Second,
Marshall affirmed the concept of separate regulatory spheres: the fact

253. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
254. Id. at 203–04.
255. Id. at 204.
256. See N. River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 732–33 (N.Y. 1825);
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 616.
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that the federal and state governments may use legislative means
resembling one another’s powers does not prove that they possess one
another’s powers concurrently. A significant implication of this
passage is the notion that states have incidental powers to engage in
what looks like commerce (or other federal) regulation—an idea that
the Taney Court would make much of, as we shall see.
Significantly, nothing in this passage or elsewhere broadens the
substance of what may be regulated as an implied commerce power
beyond commerce itself—trade and, after Gibbons, navigation.
Marshall’s suggestion that federal commerce regulations may follow
trade goods or navigation across state lines into the interior of a state
does not necessarily suggest that Congress may, under its commerce
power, build roads or regulate slavery. To be sure, one could exploit
Gibbons’ suggestion that commercial intercourse is commerce and
argue that such intercourse includes commercial traffic on roads. But,
objections to such an analogy would be easy to make: antebellum
constitutional thought viewed exercises of power on dry land as
different from those on water. Webster seemed to know his audience,
perhaps from the Court’s unwillingness to embrace a power over
internal improvements in McCulloch. In arguing Gibbons, he worked
assiduously to avoid proving too much, carefully distinguishing
between navigation, an acceptable commercial power, and internal
improvements, a controversial one. While arguing that “[i]t is a
common principle, that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers,
belong to the sovereign” as part of commerce regulation, Webster
conceded that the commerce power did not authorize Congress to
“establish ferries, turnpikes, bridges, &c. and provide for all this detail
of interior legislation.”257 Marshall embraced this distinction, revealing
a conservative edge to the definitional approach. He asserted, quite
accurately, that “[a]ll America understands, and has uniformly
understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.”258
Navigation seems to have been unique in its national character. This
distinction would encourage a future Court to reject novel or
contested definitions of commerce; it certainly cuts against readings of
Gibbons that suggest the case offered leading, rather than lagging,

257. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 19, 22.
258. Id. at 190.
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interpretations of congressional power.259 However much it may have
encouraged later Congresses to push the boundaries of its powers,
Gibbons also invited later Courts to refuse to extend the definition of
commerce beyond trade-plus-navigation. In fact, the latter is exactly
what happened over the next century.
4. Separate spheres: commerce exclusivity and reserved powers
It is well known that Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons did not resolve
the question of whether the commerce power was exclusive. Famously,
Marshall recited Webster’s exclusivity argument at great length only to
stop short of implementing it. He concluded “[t]here is great force in
this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.”260
There, the exclusivity discussion ends, and Marshall at that point shifted
to inquire whether the steamboat monopoly grant “come[s] into
collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to
which that act entitles him.”261 This inquiry, spanning the next twelve
pages of the opinion, concluded that the federal coasting license law
does indeed collide with the steamboat monopoly.262 Johnson,
chagrined by this (in his view) cop-out, wrote separately to concur in the
judgment, but upon the “materially different” ground of Commerce
Clause exclusivity. “If there was any one object riding over every other
in the adoption of the [C]onstitution, it was to keep the commercial
intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial
restraints.”263 Thus, even if “the licensing act was repealed tomorrow,”
Gibbons’ right to run his steamboat route irrespective of the New York
monopoly grant “would be as strong as it is under this license.”264
Why would Marshall flirt so extensively with a broad negative
commerce argument only to veer away sharply and rely on a statutory
preemption argument? For nearly two centuries, this feature of Gibbons
has puzzled courts and commentators, some of whom simply decided to
misread Gibbons as though the Court had in fact held that federal

259. See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1144 (2001) (asserting that “nationalist decisions such as McCulloch and Gibbons”
expressed “the Court’s broad invitation [to Congress] to exercise national power”).
260. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
261. Id. at 210.
262. Id. at 210–22.
263. Id. at 231 (Johnson, J., concurring in the judgment).
264. Id. at 231–32.

2019]

AN ERROR AND AN EVIL

981

commerce power was exclusive.265 Felix Frankfurter’s reading, though
perceptive, was more of a description than an explanation: Marshall’s
attraction to “the opportunities presented by the [C]ommerce [C]lause
to restrain local legislatures from hampering the free play of commerce
among the states” was tempered by his “hardheaded” and “pragmatic”
“empiricism in not tying the Court to rigid formulas for accomplishing
such restrictions.”266 Frankfurter went on to suggest that this made
Marshall indecisive or “confused” between his two choices.267
Marshall was both less and more confused than Frankfurter
suggested. In general, Marshall preferred to rely on interpreting
federal statutes rather than constitutional provisions to dispose of
difficult federal-state power conflicts.268 This was consistent with
Marshall’s penchant for avoiding the appearance of judicial activism.
Significantly, a dormant commerce “power” is really a power of the
Court. By definition, it relies on the Commerce Clause itself in the
absence of legislation, and can only be enforced by judicial decision.
Gibbons fits the pattern of Marshall’s decisions described by legal
historian William Nelson, in which Marshall deferred contested policy
matters to the political branches while issuing constitutional
interpretations on consensus principles.269 In Gibbons, Marshall
constitutionalized the broad consensus supporting national control
over navigable waterways by making navigation part of the definition
of commerce. But when it came to the potentially volatile question of
choosing that policy, he attributed to Congress the choice to make
navigation free and to disempower state legislatures from granting
nautical monopolies.270 Marshall’s extended flirtation with dormant
commerce exclusivity was not confused, but strategically layered. It
showed states’ rights advocates that Marshall could have decided the
case in a more far-reaching and intrusive way. Relying on the statutory
265. See, e.g., New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 158 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting)
(construing Gibbons as holding the federal commerce power to be exclusive).
266. FRANKFURTER, supra note 221, at 14.
267. Id. at 16–17.
268. For other examples of Chief Justice Marshall using this technique, see Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 447–48 (1827); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 442–47 (1821); The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239, 243 (C.C.D.
Va. 1820) (No. 17,846).
269. William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 898, 933 (1978); see also Williams, supra
note 219, at 1474–75 (arguing that Marshall relied on the statute to signal that Congress
should take the leading role in coordinating interstate commercial regulation).
270. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 230–32 (1824).
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ground, Marshall nevertheless left the threat of exclusivity hanging,
while reassuringly refraining from using it.
A second, stronger reason for Marshall to veer away from Commerce
Clause exclusivity was his uncertainty about its doctrinal logic and
implications. He was understandably reluctant to endorse a doctrine
that the dormant commerce power excluded all state police power laws
affecting interstate commerce. The problem was that many, if not
most exercises of state police powers did have such an effect. A general
theory of commerce power exclusivity would therefore raise vexed
questions about invalidating the reserved powers of the states to
regulate health, safety, morals—and race. Marshall had not worked
out a general exclusivity theory that could invalidate selected state
police powers while preserving others so as to avoid explosive
controversies. Neither had Webster, who urged, somewhat confusedly,
that the commerce power, though exclusive, was a power “to give the
general rule” from which exceptions would be recognized through “a
most reasonable construction” of the Constitution “as necessary to the
just power of the States” in cases “where the States can operate with
more advantage to the community.”271 Nor had any other judges
solved this problem, nor would they, so long as jurists were fixed on
the idea that the federal government and states occupied separate
spheres of legislative power that differed by subject matter. The Court’s
nineteenth century solution, reached nearly thirty years after Gibbons,
was to take dormant commerce exclusivity challenges on a case-by-case
basis.272 The Court’s twentieth century solution was to make concurrent
powers the rule and exclusivity the exception, not based on subject
matter, but only when state laws discriminated against commerce from
other states or unduly burdened its interstate passage.273
Marshall could not shake the separate spheres idea, as demonstrated
by his confused and ultimately unpersuasive argument that states
lacked a power to regulate interstate commerce.274 He went to great
lengths to explain that police power laws were different from
commercial regulations, even claiming that identical federal and state
laws inspecting the quality of trade goods were fundamentally different
271. Id. at 16–17, 20.
272. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851) (“We
decide the precise questions before us . . . applicable to this particular subject in the
state in which the legislation of Congress has left it.”).
273. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 435–40, 455–57 (analyzing the
progression of commerce clause exclusivity into the 20th century).
274. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197–201.
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because they came from different sources: the federal law came from
the commerce power and the state law from the police power.275 But
that is a mere tautology. Compounding the problem was Marshall’s
inability to reconcile this claim with his repeated acknowledgment that
states had the power to regulate their “completely internal” commerce.
In several other passages, Marshall contradicted himself by writing
as if an exclusive federal commerce power is incompatible with any
state regulation of commerce. This in part stemmed from his tendency
to lapse into an imprecision, not atypical of both antebellum and
modern judges, to describe the federal power as a power over
“commerce” without the “foreign” or “interstate” qualification. “We
are now arrived at the inquiry,” Marshall wrote, “What is this power? It
is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce [sic] is to be governed.”276 More tellingly, he never offered
a single example of “completely internal” state commerce regulation.
On the contrary, whenever he discussed specific types of state laws that
are not precluded by the federal commerce power, he took pains to
show that they were properly characterized as police and not commerce
regulations. For example, while conceding “[t]hat [state] inspection
laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce,”
Marshall vehemently denied “that a power to regulate commerce is the
source from which the right to pass them is derived[.]”277
These difficulties bring us back to Marshall’s choice not to treat
navigation as an implied power. He was uncertain about the exclusive
effect of federal statutes. To hold that an express constitutional grant
of federal power could make such an inroad was contentious enough;
to hold that implied powers could do so would have raised a difficult
question. Could an implied power be field-preemptive in the same way
that at least some enumerated powers were? Johnson’s circuit opinion
in Elkison answered yes.278 In the Gibbons hearing, counsel for the
steamboat monopoly argued no: “All implied powers are, of course,
concurrent,” Oakley contended, because to hold otherwise “would
deprive the States almost entirely of sovereignty, as these implied
powers must inevitably be very numerous, and must embrace a wide
275. Id. at 203–04.
276. Id. at 196.
277. Id. at 203.
278. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366) (“But the
right of the general government to regulate commerce with the sister states and foreign
nations is a paramount and exclusive right; and this conclusion we arrive at, whether we
examine it with reference to the words of the constitution, or the nature of the grant.”).
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field of legislation.”279 In other words, clever lawyers might challenge
state laws by arguing that as-yet-unexercised implied powers excluded
state laws. This might, as Chancellor Kent had argued in Livingston,
leave state legislatures guessing about what laws might be excluded.280
Even if one’s theory were that implied powers could be invoked only
where Congress had legislated, there remained disagreement or
confusion about the preemptive effect of statutes: Did they occupy an
entire field or only displace conflicting state laws? Note, too that that
distinction would not have been clear in the antebellum era. Marshall
muddied these waters further by interpreting federal licensing statutes
as creating nationwide free trade rights, which essentially rendered the
distinction between field and conflict preemption moot.281 By making
navigation an element of a definition of the word commerce in the
Constitution, Marshall sidestepped these problems.
5. The limits of Gibbons
It would be silly to argue that Marshall shrank the reach of the
Commerce Clause in Gibbons. But there is a broad middle ground
between that conclusion and the open-ended expansion of the
commerce power with which Marshall’s opinion has been credited. As
he did in McCulloch, Marshall took a middle ground with studied
ambiguity. He offered hints and phrases that readers could, and
eventually did, construe as suggesting the substantial effects test by
which the modern Commerce Clause has been interpreted as
something approaching a power to legislate for the general welfare. At
the same time, Gibbons is chock-full of language suggesting more
limited interpretations. The opinion can be read to confine implied
commerce powers to the idea that commerce regulation narrowly
construed as buying, selling, or transportation, can reach only as far as
seemingly intrastate commercial practices that affect interstate
commerce. That is to say, implied powers could not reach things that
were not deemed “commerce.” This is how Gibbons was understood in
the Lochner era.282 And the opinion can even be understood to mean
that state laws can be immunized from commerce regulation if they are
279. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 37. While there is some support in Gibbons for such
a distinction between express and implied powers, Marshall does not clarify whether
federal statutes enacted under implied commerce powers would be field-preemptive.
280. 9 Johns. 507, 576 (N.Y. 1812) (“Such a doctrine would be constantly taxing our sagacity,
to see whether the law might not contravene some future regulation of commerce . . . .”).
281. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 221.
282. See infra Section V.A.
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properly characterized as police power laws. This is how the Taney
Court understood Gibbons, as discussed in the next section. Indeed, a
sign of the limits of Gibbons’ nationalism, or at least its profound
ambiguity, is its favorable reception in the Jacksonian-dominated Taney
Court. While ignoring or even flouting McCulloch, Taney Court Justices
celebrated Gibbons as the leading case and authoritative interpretation
of the Commerce Clause.283 The Taney Court’s comfort with Gibbons
supports the notion that the case could easily be read to fit into a
jurisprudence of moderate unionism that tilted toward state sovereignty.
IV. IMPLIED COMMERCE POWERS IN THE TANEY COURT
The Taney Court decided four major cases between 1837 and 1852 that
struggled with the tension between the Commerce Clause and reserved
state powers. The four cases are unified by a single theme—the power of
states to keep out undesirable persons or things—and driven by an
overriding concern to sustain the power of states to regulate race and
slavery, without interference from the federal commerce power.
In New York v. Miln,284 the Court upheld a New York law that required
ships entering the port of New York to submit written information
about disembarking passengers and post a bond to cover the potential
costs to the city of hosting paupers or diseased persons.285 Following
Miln, the Court upheld state laws barring slave importation, in Groves
v. Slaughter,286 and regulating liquor sales, in The License Cases,287 but
struck down a state tax on interstate and foreign passenger arrivals, in
The Passenger Cases.288 These cases reflected continuing internal
disagreement and doctrinal uncertainty. The three post-Miln cases
showed the Taney Court at its most perplexed, producing nineteen
separate opinions. Before Cooley v. Board of Wardens,289 the Justices were
unable to reach consensus on the proper analysis to determine when
a state law was claimed to violate the federal commerce power.290 Yet
283. Gibbons’ primary holdings were cited seventeen times in support of the judgment
in Taney Court decisions. McCulloch was cited was cited only once for a proposition
relating to implied powers. See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840).
284. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
285. Id. at 130–31.
286. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 504 (1841).
287. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847).
288. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
289. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
290. See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 573 (Taney, C.J., concurring)
(noting the disagreement amongst the Justices regarding the underlying principles
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only The Passenger Cases produced sharp disagreement over the result,
when the Justices divided 5–4 in deciding to nullify municipal taxes on
arriving immigrants in the ports of New York and Boston.291 When it
came to the primacy of the states’ core reserved powers, particularly
the power to control slavery and race matters, the Taney Court Justices
showed remarkable consensus. This consensus entailed a rejection of
McCulloch’s idea of implied powers, at least in Commerce Clause cases.
A. Limiting Gibbons: Federal Power versus State Police Power
The issue in each case was whether the federal commerce power,
either in its dormant state or in light of a federal statute or treaty,
nullified a state law exercising the state’s “police power.” The 1837
decision in Miln established a pattern for how the Taney Court would
approach these cases. Miln involved a challenge to a New York law that
required the master or owner of any ship landing in New York harbor
to submit a written report providing the name, birthplace, residence,
age and occupation of all foreign or interstate passengers, and to post
a bond for the costs of maintenance or removal of impoverished
immigrants.292 The law plainly regulated navigation, which was
commerce under Gibbons, and indeed Congress had already imposed
similar regulations on arriving immigrants.293 But, the Court, over the
lone dissent of Justice Story, upheld the law on the ground that it was
a “police” regulation designed to aid the state’s ability to “guard
against” “the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly
convicts” by controlling immigration.294 The Court tried half-heartedly
to emphasize the law’s intrastate aim of regulating passengers after
debarkation, when they had merged with the residents of New York

governing the case); Felix Frankfurter, Taney and the Commerce Clause, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1286, 1288 (1936) (explaining the divergent views between Taney and other members
of the court over Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause); see
also Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 417, 432 (2008) (citing 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD,
1836–64 388 (1974) (“In three of the four [Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine]
cases decided by the Taney Court, so many Justices spoke for themselves alone that
‘whether majority or minority . . . [t]he opinions . . . were so diverse that attempts to
summarize could only confuse.’”)).
291. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 392, 409–10 (McLean, J., dissenting).
292. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 130–31 (1837).
293. Id. at 138; see Steerage Act of 1819, 3 Stat. 488 (1819).
294. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 142.
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and come within its jurisdiction.295 The New York law, according to
Justice Barbour’s majority opinion, was as much a matter of the
“acknowledged and undisputed jurisdiction for every purpose of
internal regulation” as was the state’s power to prosecute a foreign
sailor committing a crime on the streets of New York while his ship was
in port.296 Having characterized the law as an internal police law rather
than a regulation of commerce, and thus “the exercise of a power which
rightfully belonged to the states,” the Court asserted that it was unnecessary
to consider “whether the power to regulate commerce, be or be not
exclusive of the states.”297 But this was unconvincing: regulating passengers
at the point of debarkation plainly regulated the preceding journey.
While none of the opinions in the Taney Court’s commerce decisions
cited McCulloch on implied powers or federal supremacy, they virtually all
treated Gibbons as the leading case for construing the Commerce
Clause.298 But they construed Gibbons with a significant twist. In Gibbons,
Marshall had made a point of asserting that state laws incidentally
affecting commerce—quarantine and inspection laws, for example—did
not prove the existence of a concurrent state power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce because the laws came from a different source:
namely, police powers.299 In Miln, and thereafter, the Court turned this
notion on its head: because the law came from a different source (police
powers), it did not by definition primarily involve commerce.300
Miln thus created a template in which the Court would uphold state
laws, irrespective of their effect on foreign or interstate commerce, if
the laws could plausibly be characterized as police regulations. In The
License Cases, where the Court reviewed state laws that required a
license to sell liquor and regulated the amount to be sold, it was
difficult to characterize the regulations as non-commercial.301 While
some of the Justices in that case’s six separate opinions emphasized
that the laws regulated purely intrastate buying and selling, the

295. Id. at 138–39 (“[W]hen they have ceased to have any [connection] with the
ship, and when, therefore, they have ceased to be passengers; we are satisfied that acts
of congress . . . can . . . be said to come into conflict with the law of a state . . . .”).
296. Id. at 135, 140.
297. Id. at 132.
298. The Taney Court consensus was that Congress was properly placed in charge
of maintaining equal access of all United States citizens to the nation’s navigable
waterways. See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851).
299. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9. Wheat.) 1, 204 (1824).
300. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 102, 132.
301. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 576–77 (1847).
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dominant factor was captured by Justice Grier: “the true question
presented by these cases, and one which I am not disposed to evade,
is, whether the States have a right to prohibit the sale and consumption
of an article of commerce which they believe to be pernicious in its
effects, and the cause of disease, pauperism, and crime.”302 That is to
say, upholding the state law required emphasizing its purpose as
regulating health, safety, or morals. As Taney put it “disease,
pestilence, and pauperism are not subjects of commerce.”303
B. Reversing McCulloch: the Idea of State Self-Defense
Taney Court Justices could hardly obscure the fact that the state laws
in all of these cases had a significant effect on foreign or interstate
commerce, which should have brought them within the ambit of
federal power under Gibbons and McCulloch. It was here that the Taney
Court developed a doctrine that put McCulloch in reverse. Justice
Barbour, a states’ rights firebrand from Virginia, led the way with his
opinion in Miln. Borrowing language from McCulloch, Barbour
asserted that when a state acts within
the legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it may
use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it may think
fit; although they may be the same, or so nearly the same, as scarcely
to be distinguishable from those adopted by congress acting under
a different power . . . .304

To be sure, “in the event of collision, the law of the state must
yield.”305 But in the absence of such collision—and the Court found
none here in Miln—the state had “not only the right, but the bounden
and solemn duty . . . to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of
its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act
of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends.”306 When it
came to “all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation,
or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, . . . the
authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.”307
This reserved powers manifesto reversed McCulloch in two respects.
First, it suggested that the states’ reserved powers could defeat at least

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 631 (Grier, J., concurring).
Id. at 576–77 (Taney, C.J.).
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 137.
Id.
Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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some plausible claims of implied powers under McCulloch. An implied
power is one that is not expressly granted to Congress, and thus
presumptively reserved to the states, except to the extent it is
conducive to executing an enumerated power. But Barbour said that
state police powers are “exclusive.”308 More moderate Taney Court
Justices subsequently agreed, in language negating McCulloch, that a
state’s internal trade was “beyond the reach of Congress.”309 Despite
differences of opinion on the Court regarding Commerce Clause
exclusivity and federal power over immigration, no justice—not even
Justice Story—appears to have dissented from this robust description
of reserved state powers.310
Pushing beyond that, Taney Court Justices argued that state police
powers carry implied powers that may extend into the ambit of the
federal commerce power. In Miln, the New York passenger-report law
was not in itself a regulation of foreign paupers entering the state, but
a regulation of navigation used as means to that end.311 So long as the
end was legitimate—within state police powers—states could use
legislative means that were indistinguishable from commerce
regulation.312 Likewise, in The Passenger Cases, Chief Justice Taney
argued that regulating passengers generally was necessary and proper to
the state’s reserved power to exclude “any person, or class of persons,
whom it might deem dangerous to its peace, or likely to produce a
physical or moral evil among its citizens,” notwithstanding its incidental
effect on foreign commerce.313 This was truly McCulloch in reverse.
A broad Taney Court consensus held that the concept of reserved
state powers “has its foundation in the sacred law of self-defence, which
no power granted to Congress can restrain or annul.”314 Justice
308. Id.
309. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 608 (1847) (Catron, J.) (“[T]he
police power of the States was reserved to the States, and that it is beyond the reach of
Congress . . . .”); id. at 620 (Woodbury, J.) (“[T]he subject of buying and selling within
a State is one . . . exclusively belonging to the power of the State . . . .”).
310. Story’s lone dissent in Miln focused on commerce exclusivity; it did not take
on the majority’s discussion of reserved powers though he undoubtedly disagreed with
it. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 158 (Story, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 130 (describing the regulation as applying to master or commanders
arriving at a New York port).
312. Id. at 133 (“[W]e hold that both the end and the means here used, are within
the competency of the states . . . .”); id. at 137 (explaining that state police power laws
are constitutional even if the execution of such laws resembles federal legislative means).
313. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 466 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 457 (Grier, J.).
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Barbour’s assertion in Miln that reserved powers were “complete,
unqualified, and exclusive” was not simply the ranting of a states’-rights
firebrand. Justice John McLean, a Whig from Ohio appointed to the
Court as a bipartisan maneuver by President Jackson, was the Taney
Court’s most sustained and die-hard proponent of exclusive federal
commerce power. McLean contended that that the commerce power
was exclusive because “A concurrent power in two distinct
sovereignties to regulate the same thing is as inconsistent in principle
as it is impracticable in action. It involves a moral and physical
impossibility.”315 Yet this strict and formalistic notion of exclusive
federal commerce power was a double-edged sword, with a sharp
states’ rights edge, for McLean, too, embraced a strong version of
reserved state powers, linking police powers with an ultimate state
sovereign power of self-preservation:
Every thing prejudicial to the health or morals of a city may be
removed. Merchandise from a port where a contagious disease
prevails, being liable to communicate the disease, may be excluded;
and, in extreme cases, it may be thrown into the sea. This comes in
direct conflict with the regulation of commerce; and yet no one
doubts the local power. It is a power essential to self-preservation,
and exists, necessarily, in every organized community . . . .
From the explosive nature of gunpowder, a city may exclude it. Now
this is an article of commerce, and is not known to carry infectious
disease; yet, to guard against a contingent injury, a city may prohibit
its introduction. These exceptions are always implied in commercial
regulations, where the general government is admitted to have the
exclusive power. They are not regulations of commerce, but acts of
self-preservation. And although they affect commerce to some
extent, yet such effect is the result of the exercise of an undoubted
power in the State.316

Thus, although, “[a] concurrent power in the States to regulate
commerce is an anomaly,” McLean asserted,
It does not follow, as is often said, with little accuracy, that, when a
State law shall conflict with an act of Congress, the former must yield.
On the contrary, except in certain cases named in the Federal
Constitution, this is never correct when the act of the State is strictly
within its powers.317

315. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 399 (McLean, J., concurring).
316. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 589–90 (McLean, J., concurring).
317. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 396–97 (McLean, J., concurring).
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It is hard to see where McCulloch and federal implied powers fit into
this scheme, yet McLean seems to make room for state implied powers
to regulate in ways that incidentally affect commerce. “[W]hen a
conflict occurs, the inquiry must necessarily be, which is the
paramount law? And that must depend upon the supremacy of the
power by which it was enacted.”318 Federal laws merely incidental to
enumerated powers may well have to give way to such core interests.
This notion that conflicts between federal and state law might be
resolved in favor of the states—contrary to McCulloch and Gibbons—
commanded a consensus on the Taney Court. Justice Daniel, Barbour’s
successor as states’-rights advocate from Virginia, put it this way: “Every
power delegated to the federal government must be expounded in
coincidence with a perfect right in the States to all that they have not
delegated; in coincidence, too, with the possession of every power and
right necessary for their existence and preservation.”319 How this idea
would be harmonized with the Supremacy Clause, the Taney Court
never worked out. In The License Cases (1847), Justice Grier, a judicial
moderate from Pennsylvania, offered a suggestion:
Without attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits
of this power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the
restraint and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public
peace, health, and morals, must come within this category.
As subjects of legislation, they are from their very nature of primary
importance; they lie at the foundation of social existence; they are
for the protection of life and liberty, and necessarily compel all laws
on subjects of secondary importance, which relate only to property,
convenience, or luxury, to recede, when they come in conflict or
collision, “salus populi suprema lex.”
If the right to control these subjects be “complete, unqualified, and
exclusive” in the State legislatures, no regulations of secondary
importance can supersede or restrain their operations, on any ground
of prerogative or supremacy. The exigencies of the social compact
require that such laws be executed before and above all others.320

This suggestion that courts weigh the relative importance of federal
laws against state police power laws seems at first blush to undermine
the principle of federal supremacy. But it can be harmonized with the
Supremacy Clause if it is understood “only” as subverting McCulloch. If

318. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 588 (McLean, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 613 (Daniels, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 631–32 (Grier, J., concurring).
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federal laws of “lesser importance” are viewed as implied powers—that
is, federal regulatory inroads into reserved powers that are welladapted or convenient to executing enumerated powers—then Grier’s
opinion is consistent with, and indeed expresses, what the Taney Court
was trying to say about temperance and immigration laws, as well as
slavery, and concurrent powers: that federal implied powers must give
way to conflicting state police powers of greater importance. Grier
captures the thrust of these cases in a general principle.
C. Avoiding Commerce Exclusivity to Protect Slavery
Taney Court Justices were far more concerned with practical outcomes
than with doctrinal consistency. The first practical concern was to
preserve state police power regulation in general. The practical policy
standing behind the doctrine of commerce exclusivity was one of
nationwide domestic free trade. Story’s Miln dissent embraced the free
trade theory of commerce power, in which “the regulation of a subject . . .
produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by
changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that
upon which it has operated.”321 But replacing the dense web of state and
municipal health, safety, and morals laws with a federal regime of sparse
regulation could disorder society. Justice Catron expressed this anxiety in
The License Cases, arguing that Commerce Clause exclusivity “would
overthrow and annul entire codes of State legislation” and “expunge
more State laws and city corporate regulations than Congress is likely to
make in a century on the same subject.”322
The majority on the Taney Court may have deemed it unnecessary
to create a consistent principle of Commerce Clause exclusivity, so
long as the Court consistently maintained state control over slavery and
race. For it was this concern over slavery that primarily drove the
reverse-McCulloch doctrine of implied reserved state powers. This
became crystal clear in Groves v. Slaughter (1841), which raised the
connection between interstate commerce exclusivity and slavery in the
starkest possible fashion.323 Groves involved a suit by a slave-trader to
collect on promissory notes he had received for slaves sold on credit to
Mississippi residents. The debtors claimed that the promissory notes
were void because the sales violated a Mississippi constitutional

321. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 158 (1837).
322. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 607 (Catron, J., concurring).
323. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 495–96 (1841).
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amendment that prohibited the commercial importation of slaves.324
This ban on interstate slave sales was by no means an anti-slavery law,
but rather a discriminatory commercial measure designed to bolster
Mississippi’s internal slave market.325 Daniel Webster and Henry Clay,
representing the slave dealer, advanced the irrefutable argument that
the Mississippi provision thus represented the very type of
protectionism that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to
eliminate.326 But to nullify the Mississippi law by applying dormant
commerce exclusivity, as Webster and Clay urged, would be to
recognize that the interstate slave trade was within the regulatory
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. This would raise
serious concerns, both for slave exporting states like Virginia and for
free states. The former would fear a congressional ban on the
interstate slave trade, while the latter would worry that their laws
against slave importation would be deemed unconstitutional.
The majority opinion avoided all federal constitutional issues by
deciding that the Mississippi constitutional provision banning
interstate slave sales was not self-enforcing—that is, it was ineffective in
the absence of implementing legislation, of which there was none.327
This eliminated the debtors’ defense, leaving the notes valid and
enforceable. But Justice Baldwin apparently could not bring himself
to join this artful dodge. In a separate concurrence in the judgment,
he argued that slaves were articles of commerce, that the Commerce
Clause was exclusive, and that therefore the Mississippi law was invalid,
making the notes enforceable.328 This bit of dissension apparently
moved the other Justices to state their views on the constitutional

324. Id. at 455–56.
325. See id. at 484 (noting the Mississippi legislature’s addition of penalties to the
constitutional amendment banning the importation of slaves for sale was intended to
prevent capital outflows); id. at 487 (“Mississippi has not abandoned the introduction
of slaves . . . . The only change which has been made is, that instead of the slave trade
by strangers, the planter buys the slaves he requires, and carries them into the state for
his own use.”); Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court
Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 553 (2009) (explaining that while Mississippi residents
could travel to other states to purchase slaves, restricting the importation of slaves for
sale would prevent capital outflows form the state).
326. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 495 (“If the right in states recognising slavery exists
to prohibit trading in them, it will allow non-intercourse between the states of the
Union by legislative enactments of the states; and will authorize retaliation. This is
negatived by the decision of this Court in Gibbons v. Ogden . . . .”).
327. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 501–03.
328. Id. at 513, 517 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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questions they intended to avoid. McLean, like Baldwin, argued that
the Commerce Clause was exclusive, but differed on whether it
covered the interstate slave trade.329 McLean said no. Taney said the
exclusivity issue had been left open in Miln, the last word on the
subject.330 Story, Thompson, Wayne, and McKinley issued a joint onesentence statement that they “concurred with the majority of the
Court” that the Commerce Clause “did not interfere with the provision
of the constitution of the state of Mississippi, which relates to the
introduction of slaves as merchandise, or for sale.”331
Thus, six of seven participating Justices in Groves agreed that the
power to regulate slave trading within a state’s borders was reserved to
the states, even if the trading crossed state lines.332 Chief Justice Taney
paid lip service to federal supremacy by allowing that “[n]o one, I
believe, doubts the controlling power of Congress in this respect; nor
their right to abrogate and annul any and every regulation of commerce
made by a state.”333 Yet in almost the same breath, he also asserted,
[T]he power over this subject [slavery] is exclusively with the several
states; and each of them has a right to decide for itself, whether it
will or will not allow persons of this description [slaves] to be
brought within its limits, . . . and the action of the several states upon
this subject, cannot be controlled by Congress, either by virtue of its
power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any other power
conferred by the Constitution of the United States.334

While some of the Justices seemed to view slavery as sui generis—as
though there were a slavery exception to the Commerce Clause—
others appeared to view slavery as merely a particularly strong form of
reserved power, in a conception of reserved powers that could fend off
other forms of federal regulation as well.
Slavery loomed in the background whenever the Court reviewed a
state law aimed at protecting the inhabitants of the state from a
perceived external evil. The connection between slavery and
329. Id. at 505 (McLean, J., concurring).
330. Id. at 509 (Taney, C.J., concurring).
331. Id. at 510 (Story, Thompson, Wayne & McKinley, JJ., concurring). Story and
McKinley apparently believed that the Mississippi constitutional ban on interstate slave
sales was self-enforcing: they issued a one-sentence dissent stating that they would have
held the notes void. Id. at 517 (McKinley, J., concurring).
332. Barbour had died, and Catron missed the argument due to illness. Id. Based
on their records, however, both of these Southerners would have agreed with their
brethren on this point.
333. Id. at 509 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 508.
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immigration was built into the Constitution by the Migration or
Importation Clause, as well as by the fear that admitting free blacks
into southern states would stir up slave insurrections.335 Thus, in The
Passenger Cases, Chief Justice Taney emphatically asserted the state’s
power to exclude “any person, or class of persons, whom it might deem
dangerous to its peace, or likely to produce a physical or moral evil
among its citizens,” notwithstanding its incidental effect on foreign
commerce.336 Justice Grier was more explicit, linking the state’s power
“to repel from her shores lunatics, idiots, criminals, or paupers, which
any foreign country, or even one of her sister States, might endeavour
to thrust upon her” with “the right of any State, whose domestic
security might be endangered by the admission of free negroes, to
exclude them from her borders.”337 Even liquor sales raised the slavery
question for the Taney Court Justices. In The License Cases, Justice
Woodbury, Story’s successor from Massachusetts, likened the
temperance laws at issue to those regulating slaves and immigrants:
It is the undoubted and reserved power of every State here, as a
political body, to decide, independent of any provisions made by
Congress, though subject not to conflict with any of them when
rightful, who shall compose its population, who become its
residents, who its citizens, who enjoy the privileges of its laws, and be
entitled to their protection and favor, and what kind of property and
business it will tolerate and protect. And no one government, or its
agents or navigators, possess any right to make another State, against
its consent, a penitentiary, or hospital, or poor-house farm for its
wretched outcasts, or a receptacle for its poisons to health, and
instruments of gambling and debauchery. Indeed, this court has
deliberately said,—‘We entertain no doubt whatsoever, that the
States, in virtue of their general police power, possess full
jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them
from their borders, and otherwise to secure themselves against their
depredations and evil example, as they certainly may do in cases of
idlers, vagabonds, and paupers.’338

In The Passenger Cases, the dissenters were undoubtedly concerned in
part with a general salus populi principle that a state must be able to
protect itself from the side effects of immigration. There was substance

335. LIGHTNER, supra note 122, at 82–84.
336. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 466 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 457 (Grier, J., concurring).
338. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 554, 629 (1847) (Woodbury, J., concurring
in the judgment) (quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 542–43 (1842)).
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behind Taney’s claim that “the public history of the times”
demonstrated “that a fearful amount of disease and pauperism is daily
brought to our shores in emigrant ships,” thereby threatening public
health and the state treasury.339 But it is also clear that the prime
concern was to maintain state control over slavery. The majority’s
reasoning, Taney argued, meant that “the emancipated slaves of the
West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to reside, hire houses,
and traffic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any
State law to the contrary; inevitably producing the most serious
discontent, and ultimately leading to the most painful consequences.”340
This state power was deemed necessary by dissenters both to prohibit the
migration or importation of slaves into free states, and to prohibit the
migration of free blacks into both slave and free states.341 So strong was
the consensus that slavery-regulation was a reserved state power that it
transcended other jurisprudential disagreements. Abolitionist opinion
was not represented on the antebellum Supreme Court.
More abstract doctrinal questions were left unresolved. The Taney
Court finally reached a compromise on commerce exclusivity in Cooley
where the Court upheld a municipal pilotage law that required ships
arriving at Philadelphia to hire local pilots to steer them into port.342
Municipal pilot laws were unquestionably regulations of navigation and
hence of commerce; but, a 7–2 majority rejected across-the-board
Commerce Clause exclusivity, once and for all. Instead, the Court would
determine exclusivity on a case-by-case basis.343 Pilotage laws were
quintessentially in the latter category, according to the Court.344 Under
Cooley’s regime, commerce exclusivity would be selective, and was left
hypothetical: the Court expressly declined to state opinions about “what
other subjects, under the commercial power, are within the exclusive
339. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 467–68 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
340. Id. at 474.
341. See id.; id. at 508 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s
construction of the trade treaty constitutes an “invasion of [states’] domestic security” by
permitting “British subjects to land within the territory of any of the States cargoes of
negroes from Jamaica, Hayti, or Africa”); id. at 525–26 (Woodbury, J., dissenting)
(asserting the right of states to exclude “slaves, or, what is still more common in America,
in Free States as well as Slave States, exclude colored emigrants, though free”).
342. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (7 How.) 299, 320 (1851).
343. “[T]he power to regulate commerce,” Justice Curtis wrote for the Court,
“embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects,
quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule,” and
others better suited to diverse local regulation. Id. at 319.
344. Id.
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control of Congress, or may be regulated by the States in the absence of
all congressional legislation[.]”345 Nor did the Court clarify whether
federal exclusivity required the presence of federal statutes, or whether
“collisions” between federal and state law depended on actually
conflicting objectives.
In the end, doctrinal consistency in abstract principles regarding
commerce exclusivity was far less important to the Justices than
preserving reserved state powers in general and control over slavery in
particular. The sharpest disagreement in the Taney Court’s commerce
power decisions came in The Passenger Cases, where the Justices divided
five-to-four in striking down the municipal taxes on immigrants. The
majority held that a manifest federal policy in favor of open
immigration nullified restrictive state immigration laws that were not
especially targeted toward “paupers, vagabonds, or fugitives from
justice[.]”346 All nine Justices understood that recognizing a federal
power over immigration, whether under the commerce or treaty
powers, could, in theory, pose a threat to state slavery regulations. The
difference came down to the dissenters’ view that a federal
immigration power placed state slave regulation on a slippery slope to
unconstitutionality, and the majority’s view that slavery would be
sustained because the Court’s unanimously supported state control of
that issue, no matter what. As Justice Wayne, who voted to strike down
the state law, put it, “[t]he exercise of constitutional power by the United
States, or the consequences of its exercise, are not to be concluded by
the summary logic of ifs and syllogisms.”347 The dissenters’ fear that “the
United States may introduce into the Southern States emancipated
negroes from the West Indies and elsewhere” was unfounded because
the Court would always interpret the Constitution so as not “to dissolve,
or even disquiet, the fundamental organization of either of the States”—
that is, to preserve slavery.348
V. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN DOCTRINE
Antebellum Commerce Clause doctrine developed a robust theory
of state reserved powers in the context of negative Commerce Clause
cases to protect the scope of state regulation and to preserve state
control over slavery. In the post-bellum and later Lochner eras, the
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. at 320.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 410, 426–27 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring).
Id. at 429 (Wayne, J., concurring).
Id. at 428.
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Supreme Court “imported” the antebellum doctrine into cases testing
the limits of Congress’s affirmative commerce power. That is to say,
they used the antebellum theory of state reserved powers to limit
federal statutes, rather than to preserve state laws against dormant
Commerce Clause challenges.
This aspect of the development of Commerce Clause doctrine has been
observed by twentieth and twenty–first century Supreme Court opinions
and commentators.349 But two important features of this transition have
not been fully explored or have been entirely overlooked. First, consider
the frequent Lochner era trope that, absent strong judicial protection of
reserved state powers, the regulatory powers of the states would be
“destroyed.”350 While always an exaggeration, this assertion may have had
at least an element of truth under a nineteenth-century exclusive-powers
world view in which a grant of power to the federal government meant a
denial of that power to the states. But that element of truth would
disappear from a concurrent-powers regime.
Second, even when the Court did finally begin to apply McCulloch to
the Commerce Clause at the turn of the twentieth century, it permitted
only incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, not incidental
regulation of intrastate non-commercial activities that affected commerce.
This was the mirror image of Taney Court cases asserting that state
police powers were not commerce regulations, and therefore not
precluded by Commerce Clause exclusivity, even though they
incidentally affected commerce. The Lochner era Court turned this
around to say that intrastate subjects of reserved powers were not
commerce and thus could not be regulated under the commerce power even
though they affected interstate commerce.
A. Implied Commerce Powers in the Lochner Era
Lochner era Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which can be dated
from the Court’s decisions in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.351 in 1895
349. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1995); GILLMAN, supra
note 47, at 20–21 (arguing that Lochner era jurisprudence was fundamentally
“Jacksonian”); Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 17, at 590–95 (arguing that
Lochner-era jurisprudence maintained the narrow ante-bellum interpretation of the
Commerce Clause that had originated to limit exclusivity).
350. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295–96 (1936); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). Modern Court conservatives cling to this
hyperbole. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We have a particular
duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.”).
351. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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to Carter v. Carter Coal Co.352 in 1936, is infamous for its crabbed
construction of the federal government’s commerce power.353 This
jurisprudence can be understood as perpetuating a continuous theme:
a refusal to extend implied commerce powers beyond the incidental
regulation of intrastate commerce. The motivations underlying this
jurisprudence have been variously interpreted as the interjection of
laissez faire economics into constitutional law or as a vestigial holdover
of Jacksonian jurisprudence—with its excessive respect for reserved state
powers and its antipathy to class legislation. Either way—and there is
probably an element of truth in both interpretations—the Court’s
hostility to implied commerce powers in this period is undeniable.
While the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court reversed the Taney
Court’s rejection of a federal internal improvements power, it did so
without relying on McCulloch or a doctrine of implied commerce
powers. Instead, it simply analyzed internal improvements as interstate
commerce itself, in the form of transportation and communications.354
The main jurisprudential shift, undoubtedly influenced by reformed
ideas of national sovereignty in the wake of the Civil War, was to
emphasize the regulatory power of the national government over
“every foot” of United States soil.355
But the post-Reconstruction Court continued to adhere to the Taney
Court’s idea that some matters were reserved to the states so as to
impliedly block implied federal powers. One such matter was the
regulation of private race relations. In The Civil Rights Cases,356 the Court
struck down the 1875 Civil Rights Act,357 which prohibited race
352. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
353. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1991). See generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 70, at 252–59 (describing Lochner-era jurisprudence).
354. See California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1888) (upholding the
federal power to charter interstate railroad companies); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 1, 10 (1877) (upholding a federal statute overriding
state monopolies over telegraph lines).
355. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 27 (1890) (“The corporate government established by
the Constitution is a nation, absolutely sovereign over every foot of soil and over every
person within the national territory and within the sphere of action assigned to it.”);
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 371, 395 (1880) (“[T]he government of the United
States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute
on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it.”); Pensacola
Tel. Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto) at 10 (“The government of the United States, within the scope
of its powers, operates upon every foot of territory under its jurisdiction.”).
356. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
357. Id. at 26.
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discrimination by privately owned hotels, restaurants, and places of public
amusement.358 The 8–1 majority rejected Justice Harlan’s dissenting view
that Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause created an
implied power to prohibit private discrimination, under McCulloch and
the section 5 authorization of “appropriate legislation.”359 To the
majority, which did not acknowledge McCulloch, Congress had no implied
power to cover the case, either under the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Commerce Clause.360 The buying and selling of services could easily have
been deemed commerce, as a matter of language and logic, and
multistate discrimination in these transactions would be deemed to affect
more states than one in the twentieth century.361 But, the Court in 1883
flatly stated “[o]f course, no one will contend that the power to pass [the
law] was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last
three amendments.”362 That is to say, it was somehow obvious to the Court
that the Commerce Clause could not authorize the law. Yet, at the same
time, the Court in this era recognized a federal commerce power over
race relations on interstate transportation.363
Thanks in large part to Justice John Marshall Harlan, whose
admiration for his judicial namesake seems to have induced him to an
effort to revive McCulloch as an important precedent, the Court began
to rely on McCulloch increasingly around the turn of the twentieth
century to extend the reach of the commerce power.364 Revisionist

358. Id. at 9.
359. Id. at 51–52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
361. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964).
362. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10.
363. See id. at 19 (reserving the question of whether Congress could prohibit private
discrimination on interstate transportation facilities under the Commerce Clause). It
happens, however, that the decisions always applied to preserve segregated
transportation facilities. See Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 77
(1910) (permitting railroads to impose racial segregation on interstate passengers
absent contrary legislation by Congress); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179
U.S. 388, 394 (1900) (upholding Kentucky law that required railroad companies to
provide separate seating for black and white passengers); Louisville, New Orleans &
Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (rejecting dormant commerce
clause challenge to Mississippi law requiring segregated railroad cars); Hall v. DeCuir,
95 U.S. (5 Otto) 485, 490 (1877) (striking down a Louisiana ban on racial segregation
of passengers as an interference with interstate commerce).
364. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 578 (1895);
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 472 (1894). See generally DAVID S.
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legal historians have plausibly questioned characterizations of the
Lochner era as a monolithic jurisprudential period marked by a laissez
faire judicial philosophy and the consistent striking down of federal
economic regulation.365 Viewed in granular detail, the Court’s record
can appear mixed in the 1895–1936 period; some variation was
undoubtedly explained by shifting Court majorities, while even some
more conservative Justices acknowledged at least some federal
regulatory power over commerce.366
Yet that revisionism tends to miss the forest for the trees. The
conventional account better captures the big-picture reality that the
conception of implied commerce powers before 1937 remained highly
restricted.367 The Court was far more consistent than otherwise in its
approach to the commerce power. The power to regulate things that
were not strictly “interstate commerce” was limited to intrastate
commerce. Thus, for example, the Court recognized that Congress
could regulate intrastate railroad rates where necessary to effectuate
interstate rate regulation.368 Congress could not regulate such
intrastate activities as manufacturing or employment pursuant to the
federal antitrust laws, but those laws could reach intrastate price fixing
for goods in a national market.369 And Congress could regulate
interstate trade and intercourse to promote health, safety, or morals.370
In some of these cases, the Court cited McCulloch and discussed implied

SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (forthcoming 2019) (book manuscript on file with author).
365. David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins
of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 2, 4 (2003).
366. See id. at 10–12.
367. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 299 (1936); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 116–17 (1941).
368. See, e.g., Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351
(1914); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913).
369. Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895), with Stafford
v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518–19 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 401
(1905); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 248 (1899).
370. See Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1913)
(upholding the regulation of lottery sales); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45, 58 (1911) (upholding the federal regulation of adulterated products); McCray v.
United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63–64 (1904) (upholding the regulation of
oleomargarine); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903) (upholding the federal
regulations of “morals” of citizens).
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powers;371 in others, it did not.372 But the Court was consistent in
recognizing only two legitimate ends of implied commerce power: to
regulate intrastate commerce or to exercise a “national police power”
over the health, safety, or morals aspects of interstate trade.
Employment could be regulated only when the employees were
directly engaged in interstate transportation.373 The commerce power
extended only to trade-or-transport activities or to matters “directly
related” to such activities. The direct/indirect effects test that emerged
in this period boiled down to little more than an acknowledgment that
intrastate trade-or-transport activities could be regulated if they had
interstate effects. But intrastate activities that fell outside the traditional
definition of commerce—buying, selling, and transportation—could
not be regulated. The Court consistently held this position throughout
the Lochner era, as marked by the era’s three anti-canonical cases: E.C.
Knight in 1895, Hammer v. Dagenhart374 in 1918, and Carter Coal375 in 1936.
Each case held that employment and the production of goods were
intrastate activities whose regulation was reserved to the states, and
therefore off limits to the commerce power.376 The commerce power
jurisprudence of this era is summed up by a single arresting sentence in
Carter Coal: “In exercising the authority conferred by [the Commerce
Clause] of the Constitution,” the Court said, “Congress is powerless to
regulate anything which is not commerce . . .”377
Critics argued then and now that these cases were based on
incoherent distinctions, or were at odds with other precedents, or
both.378 The criticisms are largely true, and they get no argument here.
Yet the critics understate how much the Lochner-era cases were
thematically unified by adhering to the Taney Court’s conception of
reserved state powers under the Tenth Amendment. The Lochner-era
Courts continued to view production and employment as immune from

371. Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 58; McCray, 195 U.S. at 63.
372. Hoke & Economides, 227 U.S. at 323; Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 357–58.
373. Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51–52 (1912).
374. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918).
375. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 299 (1936).
376. Id.; Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. a1, 12 (1895).
377. Carter, 298 U.S. at 297.
378. See, e.g., E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 21–22 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Raoul
Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 711–12 (1996);
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1229–
36 (1986); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 707 (2002).
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implied commerce powers. What appeared inconsistent was the
acknowledgment that Congress could exercise police powers over
health, safety, and morals by regulating the interstate flow of goods, but
could not regulate production or employment by the same legislative
technique.379 Yet that could be explained as a concession by the Court
of a limited inroad into reserved state powers: Congress was in effect
granted a limited police power, concurrent with the states, to regulate
health, safety, or morals through the regulation of interstate trade.
B. From Exclusivity to Preemption
The Taney Court established a robust theory of reserved state powers
that blunted the reach of implied commerce powers, in order to
protect state regulation from excessive dormant commerce preclusion,
and to maintain state control over slavery. In the post-Reconstruction
era, the Court continued to apply a fairly robust theory of reserved
state powers, even as one of the main conceptual supports for this
theory evaporated. Specifically, the concern that broad commerce
powers would nullify great swaths of state law was neutralized by
doctrinal changes around the beginning of the twentieth century.
In the early 1900s, the Court subtly shifted from a predominantly
negative commerce to a preemption approach for coordinating state
and federal regulation of commerce.380 Increasingly, the Court analyzed
challenges to state statutes affecting interstate commerce by considering
whether a federal statute, rather than the inherently preclusive effect of
the Commerce Clause, displaced the state law.381 This was at least in part
an effect of the increasing number and scope of federal statutes. As
Congress began to regulate more under the commerce clause in the late
nineteenth century, challengers to state laws began to make arguments
resembling present day statutory field preemption arguments.382 By 1912,
the Court had begun inquiring into the preemptive intent of the statutes
in question. In Savage v. Jones,383 for example, the Court stated that:

379. Compare Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272, with Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227
U.S. 308, 321–22 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911); McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63–64 (1904); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903).
380. See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
381. See, e.g., id.
382. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 638–39 (1898)
(rejecting a field-preemption-type argument that state prohibition on importing
diseased cattle was preempted by the 1891 Animal Industry Act).
383. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
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the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police power
as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be
inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State.384

The cause and timing of the shift from negative commerce to
preemption analysis warrants further inquiry from legal historians.
What is clear is that the Court made no announcement of a doctrinal
shift, tending instead to obscure the shift by purporting to apply older
negative commerce cases as if they were statutory preemption cases.385
The result of these developments was quiet but significant. The leading
Commerce Clause decisions that affected the revolution in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1942, discussed in the next
sections, did not address the concurrent powers problem because, by
1937, it was no longer a problem. It is not coincidental that modern
preemption doctrine is generally traced to a case decided in this era.386
C. Implied Commerce Powers and the New Deal Turnaround
The hallmark of the New Deal’s almost legendary transformation of
U.S. constitutional law was the Court’s recognition of the idea that
Congress could regulate intrastate matters that were not traditional
buying-selling-transporting commerce. This recognition did not occur
all at once. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.387 famously marked the
turning point between the Court’s pre- and post-New Deal
jurisprudence. There the Court upheld the Wagner National Labor
Relations Act of 1935,388 and took the first step on a path by which it

384. Id. at 533; accord Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612–13
(1926); see also McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 135–37 (1913) (finding that
state labeling law conflicted with the federal Food and Drug Act).
385. In Savage itself, the Court offered as an “abundant illustration” of its statutory
intent approach a string of cases upholding state statutes against dormant commerce
clause challenges—that is, claims that the state law violated the exclusivity of the
Constitution’s grant of federal commerce power rather than a particular federal
statute. See Savage, 225 U.S. at 533–34; see also Napier, 272 U.S. at 611 (mis-citing Reid
v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902), a dormant commerce case, as though it were a
statutory preemption case).
386. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941), as the leading case for “well-established preemption principles”).
387. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
388. Id. at 30 (explaining that the NLRA guarantees employees the ability to
organize, unionize, and engage in collective bargaining).
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would thereafter uphold all New Deal legislation and all Commerce
Clause legislation for the next sixty years.389 Momentous a shift as it was,
Jones & Laughlin retained a good deal of pre-1937 jurisprudential
baggage, which the Court would not jettison until four years later, when
a majority of the Court were Roosevelt appointees.390 Compared to
Darby and Wickard, Jones & Laughlin is a sort of halfway house between
the discredited late Lochner-era cases like Carter Coal, and modern
Commerce Clause doctrine.391
Jones & Laughlin receives undue precedential respect because it
came out the right way. This is unfortunate, since it was chock-full of
crabbed phrases from soon-to-be repudiated decisions. Chief among
these is the old saw from Justice Cardozo’s concurrence in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,392 that failing to enforce strict
limits on the commerce power would “obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.”393 This language would later be plucked out
and deployed by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts when striving to
reimpose limits on the commerce power.394 Yet, Cardozo’s Schechter
quotation was in fact said in service of doctrinal claims that are no
longer good law. Among others, the Jones & Laughlin opinion
continued to recognize that the Tenth Amendment supported a
concept of reserved state powers that commerce regulation could not
“invad[e].”395 And Jones & Laughlin further asserted that, if the NLRA
had attempted to reach beyond “matters which directly affect”

389. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32844, THE POWER TO
REGULATE COMMERCE: LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER 1, 5 (2014).
390. In January 1940, Justice Frank Murphy became the fifth Supreme Court justice
nominated by President Roosevelt to be confirmed to the Court. The other Justices
are Hugo Black (1937), Stanley Reed (1938), Felix Frankfurter (1939), and William
Douglas (1939). See Supreme Court Nominations: 1789–Present, SENATE, https://www.sen
ate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
391. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 208–09 (1998) (arguing that the Jones & Laughlin case
was not revolutionary).
392. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
393. Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring quoted in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see also id. at 30 (failure to enforce strict limits on the commerce
power will “destroy the distinction . . . between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce [that] is vital to the maintenance of our federal system”).
394. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995).
395. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 29–30.
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commerce, “the Act would necessarily fall.”396 This “direct effects” test
was authoritatively rejected in Darby and Wickard.397
Not surprisingly, Jones & Laughlin maintained the longstanding
practice of declining to apply McCulloch’s broad conception of implied
powers to the Commerce Clause. The Court flirted but briefly with the
idea of implied commerce powers, noting that “the power to regulate
commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for ‘its
protection and advancement.’”398 But then the opinion quickly reins
in that statement by clarifying that intrastate activities can be regulated
only “if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions.”399 Tellingly, the sources
cited for these assertions were not McCulloch or even Gibbons, but rather
cases like Schechter Poultry and The Daniel Ball (1871) (the source of the
“protection and advancement” quote),400 the latter authored by states’
rights hardliner Justice Stephen Field. In marked contrast to Jones &
Laughlin, McCulloch did not limit implied powers to those having a
“close and substantial relation” to the primary power.401
D. The Real New Deal Transformation:
Breaking Down Reserved State Powers
In 1941 and 1942, the Court decided three cases that, unlike Jones &
Laughlin, really ushered in modern commerce power doctrine: United
States v. Darby Lumber Co., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,402 and
Wickard v. Filburn. Though the cases tend to be lumped together, there
is a subtle but important difference between the first two opinions, by
Harlan Fisk Stone, and the third opinion by Robert Jackson.
In Darby, the Court upheld the application of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) to a lumber company that sold its
products on the interstate market.403 The law included minimum wage
396. Id. at 29–31 (“It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the
congressional power.”).
397. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119–20 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 119, 123–24 (1941).
398. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36–37.
399. Id. at 37.
400. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
401. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819).
402. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
403. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941).
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and maximum hours provisions, as well as a prohibition on interstate
shipment of goods produced in violation of the act.404 Justice Stone’s
opinion for a unanimous Court explicitly overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart, and impliedly disapproved all prior precedents holding that
employment and productive activities, such as manufacturing, were
local regulatory matters reserved to the states and, therefore, outside
the reach of the commerce power.405 The Court reached that
conclusion by applying McCulloch to the Commerce Clause:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the
power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce . . . .406
Congress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of excluding
from interstate commerce all goods produced for the commerce
which do not conform to the specified labor standards, it may choose
the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted
end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities.407

Federal “control of intrastate activities” was henceforth no longer
limited to intrastate commerce strictly construed as buying, selling,
and transporting. Rather, the means to effectuate federal commerce
regulation could extend to the direct “suppression” of manufacturing
in violation of the labor standards.408 Significantly, the Court began its
legal analysis by stating that “While manufacture is not of itself interstate
commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such
commerce[.]”409 Early twentieth century precedents had applied
McCulloch only to enable Congress to regulate intrastate commerce as an
adjunct to its interstate commerce regulation. In marked contrast,
Darby for the first time acknowledged an implied commerce power to
regulate interstate things that were concededly not commerce.
This assertion amounted to an attack on the traditional Tenth
Amendment conception of reserved powers as including set categories

404. Id. at 109–10.
405. Id. at 116–17 (“Hammer v. Dagenhart . . . should be and now is overruled.”); id.
at 123 (“So far as Carter v. Carter Coal Co . . . . is inconsistent with this conclusion, its
doctrine is limited[.]”).
406. Id. at 118–19 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
407. Id. at 121.
408. Id. at 122.
409. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
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of things that could not be reached by federal regulation—again, such
as employment and production. Stone made this explicit by
announcing that the Court’s conclusion was “unaffected by the Tenth
Amendment . . . [which] states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered.”410
This pithy sentence represented a tectonic shift in federalism
doctrine. No longer would the Tenth Amendment be viewed as a
repository of defined subject matter immune from federal regulation
regardless of the requirements of interstate commerce regulation.
“From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been
construed as not depriving the national government of authority to
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end,” said Stone.411
This is questionable history. In citing McCulloch at the end of this
passage, Stone perceived the conflict between a robust theory of implied
federal powers and a robust theory of reserved state powers. And he
resolved the conflict in favor of federal power. He dismissed “[w]hatever
doubts may have arisen of the soundness of that conclusion” as mere
recent developments that “have been put to rest” since 1937.412
Wrightwood Dairy, decided the next year, is far less known and
anthologized than Darby and Wickard; but, it is comparably important
in establishing the new doctrine. In upholding a federal law
establishing milk price supports, Wrightwood Dairy extended the
commerce power principles of Darby, which had involved a company
that shipped its products interstate, to a local dairy that did no
interstate business. Stone (now Chief Justice) noted that the factual
record showed that interstate milk prices, which could concededly be
regulated under the commerce power, tended to be pulled down by
“the unregulated sale of the intrastate milk.”413 Because Congress
could reasonably conclude that it needed to regulate intrastate milk
prices as part of regulating the interstate market, it could do so under
its commerce power. Here, the Court laid out two alternate
formulations of the doctrine that underlay its ruling, the first based on
McCulloch and implied powers.
Congress plainly has power to regulate the price of milk distributed
through the medium of interstate commerce . . . . and it possesses

410.
411.
412.
413.

Id. at 123–24.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120 (1942).
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every power needed to make that regulation effective. The
commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of
commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of
Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means
to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
granted power to regulate interstate commerce.414

The second is based on Gibbons’ definitional approach.
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the
Constitution . . . . It follows that no form of state activity can
constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the
commerce clause to Congress. Hence the reach of that power
extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way
interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.415

One might be tempted to say that these tests are the same. True,
both allow Congress to regulate things that are not themselves either
interstate or commerce. But there is a difference.416
The McCulloch formulation uses interstate “effects” as a placeholder
for the means-ends connection set out in McCulloch for implied powers.
This approach applies McCulloch’s implied powers framework to
Congress’s commerce powers just as it would apply to any other
enumerated power. It positions Congress to exercise its discretion to
determine whether a particular regulation is “conducive” or “plainly
adapted” to exercising its power to regulate interstate commerce.
The Gibbons formulation, of course, is recognizable as the modern
“substantial effects” test. It rolls the regulation of intrastate matters
into the definition of the federal commerce power. That is to say, it
purports to interpret the Commerce Clause itself as authorizing
Congress to regulate intrastate matters that substantially affect
interstate commerce. Unlike the McCulloch approach, which would
apply the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Commerce Clause to
produce implied commerce powers, the Gibbons definitional formula
relies on interpretive doctrine overlaid on the Commerce Clause itself.
More importantly, the substitution of a substantiality requirement for
414. Id. at 118–19.
415. Id. at 119.
416. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (asserting there is a difference); Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra
note 17, at 592–93 (noting the difference but implying it may not matter practically).
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McCulloch’s
more
lenient
and
deferential
formula
of
“conduciveness”—with the degree of conduciveness left to the
discretion of Congress—suggests a more inquisitive judicial role and is
thus potentially more limiting.
In Wickard, issued nine months after Wrightwood Dairy, the Court
famously rejected a challenge to wheat-production quotas under the
1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act417 and upheld application of the Act
to a relatively small plot of wheat intended for use on the farmstead
rather than for sale on the open market.418 Although often described
(somewhat exaggeratedly) as the most far-reaching application of the
commerce power,419 Wickard is merely an incremental extension of
Wrightwood Dairy, which applied the commerce power to purely
intrastate selling. In Wickard, the Court simply made good on its
assertion in Wrightwood Dairy that the commerce power could be
extended to intrastate activities that were not in themselves
commerce.420 The Wickard Court announced the “aggregation”
principle, under which, the court measures the substantial effects of
an intrastate activity on interstate commerce by viewing the activity in
the aggregate, as a class of activities.421 But this principle was implicit
in Wrightwood Dairy, where the regulation was upheld against a single
local dairy producer.422 And, of course, the aggregation principle is
hardly novel, as it is implicit in all laws that regulate individual
instances of behavior to control the aggregate effects of that behavior.
Indeed, in a crucial sense, Wickard was not as broad in its doctrinal
implications as Wrightwood Dairy because it failed to apply McCulloch to
the Commerce Clause, and therefore did not establish a clear
recognition of implied commerce powers.423 Jackson’s opinion cites
McCulloch just once, in a footnote, for the proposition that conflicting
economic interests underlying a regulatory scheme “are wisely left

417. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
418. Id.
419. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (Wickard “is perhaps
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”);
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (characterizing Wickard as “the ne plus ultra of
expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence”).
420. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124–25; see United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110, 116 (1942).
421. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28.
422. See Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 116.
423. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29.
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under our system to resolution by the Congress.”424 The citation is
unexplained and seems inapt. Instead, Jackson relies heavily on
Gibbons, where “Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce
power with a breadth never yet exceeded.”425 In other words, for
Jackson, the Gibbons definitional approach was sufficient to cover the
case: the substantial effects test was built into the proper interpretation
of the Commerce Clause and required no reference to implied powers.
The government had defended the statute as an exercise of implied
commerce powers, relying heavily on McCulloch and not once citing
Gibbons.426 But Jackson does not mention implied powers in the
opinion, and barely refers to the Necessary and Proper Clause.427
E. Rethinking the Lopez “Mustbesomething” Rule
1. NFIB redux
Since Wickard, the Gibbons-definitional approach to construing the
federal commerce power has predominated over the McCullochimplied-powers approach. Hornbook Commerce Clause doctrine
features the “substantial effects test” rather than asking whether a
regulation of intrastate matters is conducive or plainly adapted to
effectuating the regulation of interstate commerce. In most cases, the
distinction is academic. In NFIB, it may have made a difference.
To be sure, there is a certain naiveté in suggesting that doctrine
dictates the results of close or highly-contested constitutional cases.
The five conservative Justices in NFIB had sufficient motivation,
whether in judicial philosophy or political preference, to mold the
doctrine to reach a particular result. But the definitional approach
facilitated the Justices’ rather forced argument that “inactivity” cannot
be regulated as commerce, while the McCulloch approach would have
made for a harder sell.
The winning argument on the Commerce Clause issue in NFIB
stemmed from the wording of the substantial effects test that dated back
to Darby. The post-New Deal Court consistently spoke of the commerce
power as extending to regulation of intrastate “activities” of one sort or
424. Id. at 129 n.29.
425. Id. at 120.
426. Brief for the Appellants on Reargument at 43–45, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942) (No. 59).
427. Justice Jackson mentions the Necessary and Proper Clause just twice, once to
summarize the government’s argument and a second time, in passing, in an historical
summary of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119, 121.
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another.428 The Court’s meaning should have been clear: as in the
manner of implied powers, Congress can regulate things that are not
interstate commerce if doing so is necessary and proper to regulating
something that is interstate commerce. There is no constitutional basis
for insisting that those non-commercial things constitute “action” rather
than “inaction.” Linguistically, it is clear that the word “activities” in the
New Deal cases was a mere placeholder, and that the Court could as well
have said “matters” or “subjects” or “things” to the same effect. Had it
done so, the almost absurd fussiness of the activity/inactivity distinction
in NFIB would have been more plainly exposed. Instead, by making the
inquiry “one of definition,” to quote Marshall’s original phrase, the
Gibbons approach gave the NFIB conservatives cover to ask whether
sitting out of the health insurance market fell within the definition of
“activity” and therefore of “commerce.”
The insistence on a rigorous adherence to the meaning of “activity”
would have been harder to sustain rhetorically under McCulloch’s
implied powers approach.
As made clear by Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Raich, the extent of Congress’s implied commerce
powers does not turn on the definitions of words, but on the practical
relationship between a specific element of a regulation and the
effectiveness of the greater regulatory whole.429 In Raich, it was the
relationship between home-growing and simple possession of
marijuana, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of a ban on
interstate distribution of marijuana, on the other.430 In NFIB, it was the
relationship between individual decisions to opt out of the health
insurance market and the viability of that market as a whole. But the
substantial effects test derives from the Gibbons definitional approach
to commerce regulation; this makes it superficially more defensible to
ask whether the proposed regulation of intrastate matters fits the
definition of “commerce power.” As noted above, there was really no
plausible way to argue that the individual mandate was not “conducive”
to regulating the interstate health insurance market. Professor Randy
Barnett quipped that Justice Scalia “would not even have to break a
sweat” to distinguish away his McCulloch-based concurrence in Raich in

428. See id. at 119–20; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119–20 (1941).
429. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
430. Id. at 29–32 (majority opinion).
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order to rule against the individual mandate in NFIB.431 Scalia may not
have broken a sweat in joining the joint dissent in NFIB, but that’s only
because he simply ignored his opinion in Raich, rather than doing the
untenable intellectual heavy-lifting of distinguishing it.
2. Normative justification for a “mustbesomething rule”
The refusal of five Justices in NFIB to embrace the full extent of
implied commerce powers lacks the normative justifications that
motivated nineteenth century Justices. Since the mid-twentieth
century, our jurisprudence has abandoned the idea that race relations
are best regulated at the state level—a change that was long overdue.
And the broad acceptance of concurrent federal and state power to
regulate commerce long ago rendered the dire concerns over
Commerce Clause exclusivity a non-issue.
The normative justifications for reserved state powers doctrine are
based on a conceptual error and a constitutional evil, and thus can’t
serve as valid justifications in our constitutional order. The error was
the inability to conceive of concurrent federal and state commerce
powers. The constitutional evil was the accommodation of slavery and
later Jim Crow by leaving individual states to decide for themselves how
best to regulate race relations.
This is not to say that restoring content to reserved powers of the
states—for instance, the activity/inactivity distinction relied upon by
the five conservatives in NFIB—lacks a normative basis. Defenders of
the distinction, including the Justices themselves, claim that imposing
ad hoc definitional limits on implied commerce powers promotes
liberty, in an anti-regulatory libertarian sense. Whether that is true as
a factual matter, or justified as a constitutional doctrine, is debatable.
What is clear, however, is that that justification lacks the historical
pedigree that is sometimes claimed for it. Laissez faire or libertarian
constitutionalism was not the driving force behind reserved state
powers and their limitation on implied commerce powers for most of
the nineteenth century.
CONCLUSION
The United States has always been a commercial nation, and this fact
was a driving force behind the grant of a federal commerce power and
431. Randy Barnett, Understanding Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion in Raich, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 9, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/03/09/understandingjustice-scalias-concurring-opinion-in-raich.
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indeed behind the calling of the Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention itself. Constitutional thinkers seem to have known, as
Daniel Webster observed, that “[a]lmost all the business and
intercourse of life may be connected, incidentally, more or less, with
commercial regulations.”432 The judicial recognition of implied powers
in McCulloch thus held enormous potential for the expansion of federal
regulatory power in the form of implied commerce powers. But this
expansion was delayed by more than a century due to anxieties about its
potential to eliminate swaths of state and municipal laws under the
nineteenth century concept of exclusive federal commerce power.
Above all, nineteenth and early twentieth century Justices seemed
concerned to maintain reserved state powers as a bulwark against
implied commerce powers in order to preserve the states’ powers to
regulate slavery and, after its abolition, to impose racial segregation.
The two pillars underlying the Court’s century of resistance to
applying McCulloch to the Commerce Clause to find implied commerce
powers—concern about commerce clause exclusivity and state control
over race relations—are long gone. Yet the decision of the five Court
conservatives in NFIB to exclude the health insurance mandate from
the federal commerce power reflects the vestigial continuation of this
resistance. The normative justification for a contemporary limit on
implied commerce powers, a libertarian constitutionalism, is a
relatively recent arrival on the scene. Its adherents must fight their
battle for constitutional interpretive preference without claiming
longstanding historical roots.

432. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9–10 (1824).

